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OPTING OUT OF GOOD FAITH 
ANDREW C. W. LUND*
ABSTRACT
 Over the past decade, the doctrine of good faith provided the central front 
in battles over directors’ fiduciary duties under Delaware law. Good faith 
played that role accidentally, through the Delaware legislature’s historically 
arbitrary determination that directors’ violations of good faith cannot be ex-
culpated via charter amendment. Whether the duty of good faith was violated 
was—and is—often the operative question for determining director liability. 
In its most recent iteration, a director’s “conscious disregard of duties” will 
violate the duty of good faith and, consequently, will be nonexculpable. If ro-
bustly applied, the conscious disregard standard would threaten to swallow 
up the kind of duty of care claims that are expressly exculpable under most 
Delaware firms’ charters. If applied more restrictively, as the Delaware Su-
preme Court recently did in Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co., the conscious 
disregard standard would cease to be meaningful. Given the uncertainty sur-
rounding the value of these competing considerations, this Article contends 
that any attempt to calibrate the proper application of conscious disregard 
was bound to err in one direction or the other. Instead, the optimal solution 
would have been for (1) courts to ensure the advantages of targeted culpabili-
ty determinations through a robust version of the conscious disregard stan-
dard and (2) the legislature to permit firms to precommit and opt out of that 
standard. Although the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision may have 
effectively foreclosed this path by reducing the pressure on the legislature to 
act, the story of “good faith” serves as a reminder that mandatory rules in 
corporate law should be heavily scrutinized, else they lead to inefficient re-
sults, whether contemplated or not.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Until recently, the duty of good faith held a certain prominence in 
Delaware corporate law. Good faith was violated, according to Dela-
ware courts, by a director’s conscious disregard of his or her duties, 
though that standard’s application was significantly underdeveloped. 
The emergence of good faith generally, and the conscious disregard 
standard specifically, as distinct grounds for director liability was 
met with applause in some quarters and skepticism in others. Oppo-
nents argued that a robust conscious disregard standard would 
thwart corporate constituencies’—including shareholders’—revealed 
preferences for little or no director liability for what are essentially 
“care” issues. Proponents held out hope that the duty would provide 
necessary discipline for shirking boards otherwise protected by both 
the business judgment rule and due care exculpation clauses. In 
Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan,1 the Delaware Supreme Court effec-
tively ended the debate, strongly limiting conscious disregard’s, and 
therefore good faith’s, applicability in most contexts.2 This Article 
suggests that as a result of that decision, Delaware has missed an 
opportunity to develop the most efficient structure of fiduciary duties. 
Instead of the Supreme Court’s evisceration of good faith, Delaware 
would have been better served by a liberal construction of the con-
scious disregard standard, coupled with permitting firms to precom-
mit against director monetary liability under such a standard. This 
solution would best enable private ordering, where such ordering 
would not have been materially affected by market failure.  
 This is not to say that the Supreme Court’s decision was wrong 
given the circumstances extant at the time, namely the limited abili-
ty of Delaware courts to ensure legislative action. Indeed, this Article 
proceeds from a perspective of relative agnosticism about the con-
scious disregard standard absent the ability to opt out of director’s 
monetary liability. Facing such constraints, the court may have done 
                                                                                                                    
 1. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
 2. Id. at 239-44. 
2010]                         OPTING OUT OF GOOD FAITH 395 
the right thing in severely limiting causes of action based on lack of 
good faith. Rather, this Article seeks to demonstrate how Delaware 
law was prevented from adopting the most efficient structure of fidu-
ciary duties because of the unconsidered and indefensible mandatory 
nature of the good faith obligation. 
 The rise and fall of the conscious disregard standard is directly 
traceable to the Delaware legislature’s choice, via Delaware General 
Corporation Law (DGCL) section 102(b)(7), to allow firms to excul-
pate directors for monetary liability based on duty of care violations.3
The ability to exculpate flowed from the view that the costs of due 
care claims to firms—most notably their effect on Director and Offic-
er (D&O) insurance availability and cost—may outweigh their bene-
fits. Pursuant to section 102(b)(7), however, firms may not exculpate 
directors for actions taken “not in good faith.”4 Once the Delaware 
Supreme Court defined “not in good faith” to include action or inac-
tion through which a director “demonstrat[es] a conscious disregard 
for his [or her] duties,”5 directors faced potential liability outside of 
the traditional self-dealing context. Moreover, if the standard of re-
view used in determining conscious disregard vel non were broad 
enough, directors would face potential liability for otherwise excul-
pated due care violations. Even though due care breaches would still 
be subject to exculpation, conscious due care breaches would not be. 
Thus, the circumstances under which “consciousness” of a due care 
breach would be inferred became vitally important.  
 Of course, differentiating between unconscious acts and conscious 
acts is a familiar approach for organizing a liability scheme. Under 
generally accepted culpability theories, ordinary negligence is less 
culpable than conscious negligence. But the inability to sharply distin-
guish conscious due care breaches from unconscious ones reintroduces 
the same costs that led to the adoption of section 102(b)(7) in the first 
place. If it is difficult for courts to predictably determine directors’ 
states of mind, the requisite line-drawing is liable to be a relatively ar-
bitrary process. As due care bleeds into conscious due care, any advan-
tages gained by permitting due care exculpation begin to evaporate.  
 The difficulty of establishing an appropriate application of the 
conscious disregard standard was not a hypothetical one. During the 
year preceding the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyondell, the Dela-
ware Chancery Court applied the conscious disregard standard in 
ways that were difficult to reconcile with each other.6 Drawing the 
                                                                                                                    
 3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006). 
 4. Id.
 5. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. De-
riv. Litig. (Disney V), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)). 
 6. See McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274-75 (Del. Ch. 2008) (holding that the 
board’s sale of a division might have been a breach of the board’s duty of care, but it did not 
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line between gross negligence—the standard of review for due care 
claims—and conscious gross negligence did, in fact, seem arbitrary. 
Adjusting the test for conscious disregard at the margins was likely 
to be an unsatisfactory solution. Any such attempt was bound to be 
overinclusive or underinclusive with respect to the kinds of claims 
that would qualify as demonstrating conscious disregard. The former 
would tend to conflict with the privately ordered preferences against 
director liability in due care cases, while the latter would tend to 
eviscerate the new good faith doctrine and any potential advantages 
of more precise culpability distinctions. 
 This Article was originally conceived as a qualified rejection of ex-
actly the kind of underinclusive test the Supreme Court ultimately 
adopted in Lyondell. Because the conscious disregard standard of-
fered the promise of aligning liability more closely with culpability, it 
was worth saving and developing, certainly to the extent it could 
have been done without neutering due care exculpation clauses. The 
better way to address the legitimate concerns over the tension be-
tween section 102(b)(7) and a robust version of good faith would have 
been to amend the General Corporate Law to allow corporations to 
exculpate directors from conscious disregard claims.  
 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyondell, it appears that 
the train has left the station on that approach. It is difficult, though 
perhaps not impossible, to imagine that conscious disregard remains 
capable of a disciplining effect given the opinion’s extreme language. 
Accordingly, there is little need to permit exculpation of conscious 
disregard claims to protect due care exculpation. Nevertheless, the 
advantages of the approach advanced in this Article provide support 
for closely scrutinizing limitations on private ordering in Delaware 
law. While proponents of a robust good faith doctrine might have 
been dismayed by amending section 102(b)(7) to allow for conscious 
disregard exculpation, that rule’s mandatory nature created the 
pressure that ultimately led the Supreme Court to eliminate con-
scious disregard actions more generally. While evidence from the his-
tory of due care exculpation indicates that many corporations might 
have adopted clauses exculpating directors from conscious disregard 
claims, we cannot be certain that this would have been the case. And, 
even if it was, mass exculpation would provide some evidence of the 
desirability of limiting a conscious disregard standard. While that 
evidence might not have been dispositive, it would have been more 
                                                                                                                    
rise to the level of a conscious disregard of that duty); Ryan v. Lyondell, No. 3176-VCN, 2008 
WL 2923427, at *18-19 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008) (opining that the sale of a company may have 
breached the board’s duty of care and may have also violated its duty of good faith); see
also M&A Litigation Commentary, http://mandalitigationcommentary.blogspot.com/2008/09/ 
are-chancery-courts-decisions-in-ryan-v.html (Sept. 11, 2008, 18:30 EST) (describing how the 
facts in McPadden and Ryan differed dramatically). 
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persuasive than anything offered by the Lyondell court to justify its 
unilateral, but entirely predictable, neutering of conscious disregard. 
 Part II traces the history of due care exculpation clauses. Almost all 
corporations have availed themselves of the opportunity to precommit 
to exculpating directors from monetary damages for due care liability. 
Part II also traces the history of the duty of good faith and, in particu-
lar, the conscious disregard standard. It concludes by showing the 
Chancery Court’s difficulty in determining what behavior counted for 
evincing a conscious disregard. 
 Part III describes the consequences of that difficulty, particularly 
the potential for the pre-Lyondell conscious disregard standard to 
swallow up due care exculpation. Part III continues by making the 
strong and weak cases for respecting due care exculpation decisions. 
But while those decisions ought to be protected, the conscious disre-
gard standard is situated at a qualitatively different point on any spec-
trum of director misbehavior. Thus, if the intrusion on due care excul-
pation could have been minimized, conscious disregard as a standard 
of liability might have been worth saving. 
 Part IV discusses alternative proposals for distinguishing due care 
claims and good faith claims, some of which are explicit attempts to in-
sulate due care from encroachment by good faith. It concludes that 
each such attempt is bound to suffer from one or more of a number of 
maladies. This Part then presents an alternative: leaving the new doc-
trine of good faith free to remain vague or overinclusive (although not 
underinclusive) while allowing corporations to opt out of conscious dis-
regard liability.  
 Part IV continues by discussing potential objections to that ap-
proach. First, it may be that the charter amendment process, and thus 
any process by which conscious disregard liability would be excul-
pated, would not have reflected firm constituents’ true preferences. 
Second, it may be that the arrangement would have allowed firms to 
exculpate in certain circumstances that even an underinclusive ap-
proach to conscious disregard would not, a result which might have re-
duced firm value. Finally, it may be that a nonexculpable duty of good 
faith offers Delaware valuable rhetorical space within which to shift 
its fiduciary duty doctrine in order to prevent federal preemption, and 
mass adoption of conscious disregard exculpation would have closed 
that space. Part IV concludes by noting that these objections are ulti-
mately unpersuasive. 
II.   EXCULPATION CLAUSES AND GOOD FAITH
 Exculpation clauses and good faith have a complicated history to-
gether. Section 102(b)(7) permits firms to adopt charter provisions ex-
culpating directors from monetary liability for due care breaches but 
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not for acts or omissions not in good faith. It then stands to reason that 
since section 102(b)(7)’s adoption the Delaware courts have dealt with 
the concept of good faith in the statute’s shadow.7
A.   Exculpation Clauses 
 Prior to 1985, outside directors of public companies were rarely if 
ever held personally liable for violating their duty of care.8 Delaware 
courts had adopted a strong business judgment rule which insulated 
directors’ decisions from judicial second-guessing, at least so long as 
there was no evidence of self-dealing. Although the duty of care re-
quires that directors use the “skill, diligence, and care” of a reasonable 
person,9 the standard of review for courts in duty of care cases is “gross 
negligence.”10 The Delaware Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Van 
Gorkom11 seemed to substantially alter that policy decision insofar as 
it liberally construed how “gross” such negligence had to be to create 
liability.12 Indeed, the case was the subject of a cottage industry of law 
review articles, most of which offered negative appraisals.13 Van Gor-
kom has famously been called an “atrocious” decision14 and “one of the 
worst decisions in the history of corporate law.”15 The gist of the criti-
cism is that the decision failed to pay proper respect to the policies un-
derlying the business judgment rule and foisted a purely formalistic 
                                                                                                                    
 7. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Over-
sight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 588-90 (2008) (noting that the exculpation-related consequences 
appeared to be the “tail wag[ging] the dog” of courts’ analysis of the good faith duty).  
 8. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 
J. CORP. L. 377, 409 (1990). 
 9. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123 (1986). 
 10. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct 
and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993) (describing 
the differences between the standard of conduct and standard of review in care cases). 
 11. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 12. But see Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 476 (2007) 
(arguing that Van Gorkom’s language was not novel). 
 13. See, e.g., Eric A. Chiappinelli, Trans Union Unreconsidered, 15 J. CORP. L. 27 (1989); 
Krishnan Chittur, The Corporate Director’s Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10 
DEL J. CORP. L. 505 (1985); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans 
Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437 (1985); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Smith 
v. Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477 (2000); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The 
Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 BUS. LAW. 1187 (1986); Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L. J. 127 (1988). 
 14. Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After 
Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (1985). 
 15. Fischel, supra note 13, at 1455.  
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(and potentially inefficient) process requirement on all board action,16
particularly board action in end-game situations.17
 Commentators generally believed Van Gorkom affected the mar-
ket for director and officer (D&O) liability insurance. The confluence 
of increased merger and acquisition (M&A) activity and business 
failures had already required D&O insurers to rethink their stan-
dard contracts with companies or cease issuing policies altogether.18
Van Gorkom’s apparent weakening of the business judgment rule 
seemed to exacerbate the situation.19 Recognizing the uncertainty 
facing corporate directors and the consequent threat posed to its po-
sition as the state of choice for incorporation, Delaware acted quick-
ly.20 By the middle of 1986, the legislature passed section 102(b)(7), 
allowing corporations to adopt charter provisions “eliminating or li-
miting directors’ personal, monetary liability for breach of fiduciary 
duties.”21 The ability to exculpate is not limitless—nonexculpable 
claims include those based on a breach of the duty of loyalty, acts or 
omissions not in good faith, intentional misconduct, knowing viola-
tions of the law, improper distributions, and transactions from which 
a director derived an improper personal benefit.22 Beyond those limi-
                                                                                                                    
 16. Id. at 1453; William T. Quillen, Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral 
Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465, 469 (1985); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An 
Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment 
Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 675, 676 n.5 (2002) (noting that some have called Van Gorkom the 
“investment bankers’ full employment doctrine”). 
 17. In this way, some commentators have described Van Gorkom as the precursor to 
Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 13, at 135-40. 
 18. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Good Faith, State of Mind, and the Outer Boun-
daries of Director Liability in Corporate Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1131, 1142 (2006); 
Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 
EMORY L. J. 1155, 1158 (1990). 
 19. Questions remain as to whether the decision in Van Gorkom actually contributed 
to the insurance crisis. As Romano described:  
D&O insurers did not respond to the enactment of limited liability statutes 
[that cut out the kind of liability imposed under Van Gorkom] by lowering pre-
miums. . . . There are at least two plausible explanations for the stickiness in 
rates. First, the statutes in most states do not exempt from liability claims for 
breach of the duty of loyalty, violation of federal securities laws, and breach of 
the duty of care by directors who are also officers. Since class actions alleging 
federal securities law violations tend to generate larger recoveries than deriva-
tive suits, the cases the statutes eliminated from liability tend to cost insurers 
less. Of course, some of the claims not eliminated by the statutes, including cer-
tain duty of loyalty claims, are not covered by the typical insurance policy ei-
ther. Second, and perhaps more important, the statutes’ effectiveness will de-
pend on how courts interpret them.  
Romano, supra note 18, at 1161. Nowicki goes further and concludes that there is no com-
pelling evidence that there was an insurance crisis after Van Gorkom, or that if there was, 
the decision had anything to do with it. See Nowicki, supra note 12, at 479. 
 20. See Bruner, supra note 18, at 1143-45 (describing the environment after Van Gorkom). 
 21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006). 
 22. Id.
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tations, injunctive relief remained available even in duty of care cas-
es.  
 Section 102(b)(7)’s exceptions are notorious for their redundancy 
and the generally poor quality of their drafting.23 For example, it is 
difficult to imagine a breach of the duty of loyalty that is not already 
covered by one of the other enumerated exceptions.24 In any event, it 
is reasonably clear that the legislature intended exculpation under 
section 102(b)(7) to be available for monetary damages payable for 
breaches of the duty of care. The commentary accompanying section 
102(b)(7)’s adoption discusses only the need to respond to “recent 
changes in the market for directors’ liability insurance . . . [which] 
have threatened the quality and stability of governance in Delaware 
corporations because directors have become unwilling, in many in-
stances, to serve without the protection which such insurance pro-
vides . . . .”25 But Van Gorkom and the uncertainty it was perceived to 
have created regarding Delaware’s duty of care (and hence director 
liability for due care violations) was certainly a contributing, if not 
the contributing, factor behind the statute’s adoption.26 With section 
102(b)(7) in place, corporations could avoid the vagaries of an evolv-
ing definition of gross negligence and commit themselves to a partic-
ular view of directors’ monetary liability, i.e. there would be none. 
B.   Good Faith 
Obviously, a key to the impact of section 102(b)(7) is Delaware’s 
definition of “not in good faith.”27 In fact, the term’s definition is elu-
sive and received little explicit treatment for a number of years fol-
lowing section 102(b)(7)’s adoption. Even the substance that even-
tually developed surrounding good faith did not easily lend itself to 
practical application, thus raising serious concerns as to its utility. 
1.   The Unknown Quantity 
 The legislative history for section 102(b)(7) does not help in supply-
ing a definition. In a recent law review article, one of the four members 
                                                                                                                    
 23. See, e.g., Bruner, supra note 18, at 1150 (characterizing the exceptions as “ill-fitting”).  
 24. See id.
 25. Chapter 289, Laws of 1986: § 102. Contents of Certificate of Incorporation, Com-
ment (Del. 1986), reprinted in R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS I-12 (3d ed. Supp. 2005). 
 26. See, e.g., John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors 
to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging 
Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L
111, 113 (2004). Again, it may be that the Delaware legislature exaggerated the threat posed 
by Van Gorkom to the D&O insurance market. See Nowicki, supra note 12, at 479; Romano, 
supra note 18, at 1161. It is enough to say, however, that the legislature acted based largely 
on its perception of that threat whether or not it was mistaken in doing so. 
 27. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). 
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of the council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State 
Bar Association—the group responsible for drafting the section—
wrote, with respect to excluding actions not in good faith, “the drafters 
were simply trying to reach consensus on the terms of a statute that 
would immunize conduct that only breached the duty of care, but not 
that involved more serious misconduct.”28 The author’s memory of the 
discussion surrounding the phrase’s inclusion does not indicate the 
group held a coherent view as to the exception’s purpose.29
 The phrase had been floating around Delaware corporate law long 
before the adoption of section 102(b)(7) without much in the way of 
explication.30 During that time, the term also turned up in other sta-
tutory sections.31 Section 145, which grants corporations the power to 
indemnify their directors and officers, limits that power to instances 
in which the directors or officers acted in “good faith,”32 with no fur-
ther specification as to a definition. The phrase also made its way in-
to judicial opinions. In 1984, good faith was prominently mentioned 
in the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Aronson v. Lewis, 33
playing a role in Aronson’s canonical version of the business judg-
ment rule. That version keyed the protection provided by the busi-
ness judgment rule on a presumption that the directors, among other 
things, acted “in good faith.”34    
 Throughout this period, however, the courts never actually de-
fined “good faith.”35 The Aronson court, for instance, made no attempt 
to explain what it meant by the phrase, even though it spent some 
time discussing another condition for the business judgment rule, a 
board’s informed decisionmaking.36 Good faith appears to have large-
ly breezed into and out of Delaware corporate law without any gener-
ally agreed-upon meaning.  
 How could a concept that surfaces at so many points in the law go 
undefined for so long? It may very well be that more established doc-
                                                                                                                    
 28. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith 
in Corporation Law, GEO. L. J. *43 (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1349971. 
 29. See id. at *44. (“The participants recall the conversation going something like this: 
Mr. Balotti and Mr. Sparks asked Mr. Rosenthal, ‘Well, how does that differ from viola-
tions of the duty of loyalty?’ Mr. Rosenthal said, ‘I don’t know, but I need it in there to get 
my people on board.’ The rest of the drafters agreed to inserting ‘good faith violations’ in 
there so as not to get the plaintiff’s bar opposing the adoption of § 102(b)(7).”). 
 30. See, e.g., Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 47 A.2d 479, 489 (Del. 1946).  
 31. See tit. 8, §§ 145, 141(e). 
 32. See id § 145(b). Directors and officers need not have acted in good faith if they, 
nonetheless, were victorious in a suit brought against them based on actions taken while 
holding director or officer positions. See id. § 145(c). 
 33. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 34. Id. at 812. 
 35. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in 
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 14-16 (2005).  
 36. See 473 A.2d at 812.  
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trinal categories were able to carry good faith’s water. A notion of good 
faith separate from the duties of care and loyalty just may not have 
been needed as an accountability mechanism. Along this line, Sean 
Griffith has contended that the undertheorization of the concept was 
at least useful, if not purposeful.37 In his account, good faith has served 
as a “loose rhetorical device” giving courts discretion to impose liability 
outside of the more well-developed duties of care and loyalty.38 This 
space allowed Delaware courts to shift the balance between board au-
thority and accountability as politically necessary.39 The relevant ne-
cessity arose whenever Delaware law might have been viewed as un-
responsive to new governance realities making the threat of federal 
preemption more significant.40 In the face of federal preemption, the 
undefined concept of good faith could then provide Delaware courts 
with a way to increase accountability in the short term. When the tide 
eventually turned, its lack of definition would allow courts to ultimate-
ly shift back towards deference to board authority.41
 Whatever the reasons, it is certainly true that good faith remained 
something of an empty vessel during the immediate aftermath of 
Aronson and the adoption of section 102(b)(7). During this period, ra-
ther than interpreting the content of the phrase, Delaware courts 
spent time debating its status. In Cede Co. v. Technicolor (Cede II),42
the Delaware Supreme Court required that plaintiffs, in order to re-
but the business judgment rule, provide “evidence that directors, in 
reaching their challenged decision, breached any one of the triads of 
their fiduciary duty—good faith, loyalty or due care.”43 This triadic 
formulation did not require or provide any specific content to the du-
ty of good faith.44 However, including it with, and separating it from, 
                                                                                                                    
 37. Griffith, supra note 35, at 34. 
 38. Id.
 39. See id. at 44. 
 40. See id. at 45-47.  
 41. See id. at 57-58 (“When federal preemption looms large, as in periods of scandal 
and crisis, corporate law judges manipulate doctrine to increase management accountabili-
ty in hopes of quieting calls for federal intervention. When the risk of federal intervention 
recedes, however, the corporate lobby may reassert itself, pressing the legislature and, in-
directly, the judiciary to return to a position of board deference. This motion, forward and 
back, along the authority/accountability spectrum as a function, not of law, but of the 
extralegal pressures exerted upon the judiciary, is the essence of corporate law jurispru-
dence. The rhetorical devices, whether ‘good faith’ or ‘intermediate scrutiny’ or ‘business 
judgment,’ are the tools that the judiciary employs to accomplish this motion.”); see also
Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1927-37 (1998) (providing more on the strategic implications of inde-
terminacy in Delaware’s corporate law). 
 42. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). 
 43. Id. at 361. 
 44. The argument for including good faith as a coequal was somewhat belied by the 
three Delaware supreme court opinions. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 
569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989). Aronson itself is hardly emphatic in its advocacy for a co-equal du-
ty of good faith. See Griffith, supra note 35, at 4 n.6 (noting that Aronson simply lists good 
2010]                         OPTING OUT OF GOOD FAITH 403 
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty accomplished two things doc-
trinally. First, good faith was now a fiduciary duty, seemingly coe-
qual with the more traditional dyad of due care and loyalty. Second, 
the triadic formulation indicated that good faith was not care or 
loyalty. After Cede II, the Supreme Court continued to sporadically 
invoke the triadic formulation for eight years, without actually decid-
ing what good faith meant.45
2.   Disney and Stone 
 By 2003, however, Delaware courts set about the task of defining 
at least one aspect of good faith. That year, Chancellor Chandler is-
sued an opinion in the long-running dispute between Disney’s share-
holders and its board over the employment contract between the 
company and Michael Ovitz.46 The facts of the Disney case and the 
arrangements with Ovitz have been summarized elsewhere.47 In 
short, the Disney compensation committee negotiated an employ-
ment contract with, and the board hired, Ovitz after a process that 
fell considerably short of best corporate practices. Plaintiff share-
holders alleged that the board members violated their duty of care 
and duty of loyalty. Given a chance to replead, the plaintiffs alleged a 
                                                                                                                    
faith “alongside violations of care and loyalty as situations to which the business judgment 
rule will not apply, [but] not as a separate and equal mode for analyzing fiduciary duty” 
and concluding “[j]udicial recitations of good faith as a separate fiduciary duty are thus the 
result of a quotation taken out of context”). Moreover, Van Gorkom—the middle step in 
Cede II’s string of references seems to collapse good faith into the duty of loyalty more  
generally. On the page immediately following the one cited by Cede II, the Van Gorkom
opinion declares: 
Thus, a director’s duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the na-
ture of a duty of care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty. Here, there were 
no allegations of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, or proof thereof. Hence, it is 
presumed that the directors reached their business judgment in good faith and 
considerations of motive are irrelevant to the issue before us.  
488 A.2d at 872-73 (citation omitted). That good faith’s place in the “triad” was thus on 
somewhat shaky ground did not go unnoticed. The formulation would be attacked over 
time in the Chancery Court—by Vice Chancellor Strine in particular—as improperly ele-
vating good faith to a coequal status with loyalty and due care and differentiating good 
faith from loyalty. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003); In 
re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475-76 n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (ob-
serving that Cede II itself is equivocal on the coequal status of good faith). But see Melvin 
A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 15-21 (2006) 
(criticizing Vice Chancellor Strine’s argument). 
 45. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001); McMullin v. Beran, 
765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Del. 
1999); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995). 
 46. In re Walt Disney Deriv. Litig. (Disney III), 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 47. See Marc I. Steinberg & Matthew D. Bivona, Disney Goes Goofy: Agency, Delega-
tion, and Corporate Governance, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (2008); Lawrence Lederman, Disney
Examined: A Case Study in Corporate Governance and CEO Succession, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 557, 561-568 (2008) (providing more information about the facts of the case).                                                
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breach of due care with more particularity and argued that the facts 
underlying the due care violation gave rise to the inference that the 
directors acted in bad faith. The latter claim was important because 
Disney had adopted a section 102(b)(7) clause. 
 The Chancery Court held that the allegations raised an issue as to 
the duty of good faith, and therefore, the exculpation clause did not 
require dismissal.48 More specifically, the court found that the plain-
tiffs successfully pled a breach of good faith by alleging “that the de-
fendant directors consciously and intentionally disregarded their re-
sponsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude con-
cerning a material corporate decision.”49 Plaintiffs were successful 
despite their not pleading a traditional loyalty issue.50 Importantly, 
in carving out this new space between due care and traditional loyal-
ty, Disney III indicated that directorial action (or inaction) must have 
some sort of subjective aspect—consciousness or intentionality—to 
qualify. Disney III did not address, however, what would suffice to 
prove such a state of mind. 
 After Disney III, Hillary Sale argued that the relevant standard 
for demonstrating lack of good faith should be broader than con-
sciousness or intent. Instead, Sale proposed basing liability on the 
obviousness or egregiousness of director misbehavior.51 Under this 
formulation, managerial underperformance—though not necessarily 
intentional or conscious—could be worse than grossly negligent and 
thus treated differently for liability purposes.  
 As Sale was writing, the Disney litigation moved along. By 2005, 
the Chancery Court concluded a trial in the case and issued an eigh-
ty-four-page opinion.52 In deciding that plaintiffs had failed to prove a 
                                                                                                                    
 48. Disney III, 825 A.2d at 290. 
 49. Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted). 
 50. Disney III thus appears to be the first case in which an alleged breach of the duty 
of good faith was allowed to proceed without a viable due care (because of the exculpation 
clause) or loyalty claim. See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business 
Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L.
REV. 398, 414 (2007). Yet Disney III did not write on an entirely blank slate. Seven years 
before Disney III, Chancellor Allen explicitly found a board duty to monitor and held that 
this duty required some affirmative steps be taken to produce a monitoring system.  In re 
Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). The details of the monitor-
ing system would generally be left to the board, leaving only a question as to whether there 
was a “sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter 
failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists.” Id. at 
971. The description of the duty to monitor included a number of references to good faith, 
which may or may not have been an intentional nod to Delaware’s exculpation statute (dis-
cussed infra Part II.C.). In any event, the Caremark standard is rightfully seen as a pre-
cursor to the “conscious and intentional disregard” standard established in Disney III. See
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s
Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719, 729 (2007). 
 51. Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 493 (2004). 
 52. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
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violation of the duty of good faith, Chancellor Chandler had to grap-
ple once more with the uncertain question of defining the concept. In 
an apparent nod to Sale’s article, Chancellor Chandler noted that 
“[i]t is unclear, based upon existing jurisprudence, whether motive is 
a necessary element for a successful claim that a director has acted 
in bad faith . . . .”53 Chancellor Chandler further observed that, al-
though there may be other ways to violate the duty of good faith, con-
scious disregard was an appropriate standard of conduct for the duty 
of good faith.54 The opinion also stated that even with this explicitly 
subjective standard of conduct,55 it was unclear whether, for purposes 
of a court’s standard of review, intent or motive must be directly 
proven or whether it could be inferred from directors’ actions.56 That 
is, “egregiousness” might be an appropriate standard for determining 
satisfaction of good faith and might also suffice as evidence necessary 
to prove the more subjective conscious disregard standard. 
 The decision in Disney IV was appealed to the Delaware Supreme 
Court, which affirmed.57 The court noted that any of the good faith 
claims in the case necessarily failed because (1) plaintiffs conceded 
that their good faith claims were identical to their due care claims and 
(2) the court had already affirmed the Chancery Court’s determination 
that there was no breach of due care.58 Nevertheless, the court contin-
ued, in dicta, to delve more deeply into the substance of good faith, con-
firming the subjective test suggested by the Chancery Court in Disney 
III and Disney IV. According to the court, directors violate their duty of 
good faith when, among other things, they “[i]ntentionally fail[] to act 
in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard 
for [their] duties.”59 However, gross negligence alone cannot implicate 
                                                                                                                    
 53. Id. at 754. 
 54. Id. at 755-56. Chief among these avenues to lack of good faith is illegal action. See
Bainbridge et al., supra note 7, at 592-93 (arguing against illegality as a lack of director’s 
good faith). But see Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 31-37. 
 55. See Gold, supra note 50, at 424-25. 
 56. Id. at 426. 
 57. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (Disney V), 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006). 
 58. Id. at 63. 
 59. Id. at 67. After Disney V’s explicit adoption of a consciousness-based standard, 
some commentators advocated for a more comprehensive duty of good faith. One alterna-
tive suggested that good faith could serve as an umbrella concept for a number of seeming-
ly disparate obligations, all of which seem to fall outside of traditional care and loyalty 
analyses. See Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 51 (arguing that the duty of good faith encom-
passed a proscription on illegal actions, the duty of candor, and a prohibition on obtaining 
“action by a corporate organ through the use of a manipulative process that violates gener-
ally accepted basic corporate norms”).  
 Nowicki has argued that good faith should be a duty to act positively in certain ways, 
rather than merely avoiding conscious disregard and/or egregious mistakes. See Elizabeth 
A. Nowicki, A Director’s Good Faith, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 457, 529-31 (2007) [hereinafter No-
wicki, Director’s Good Faith]; Nowicki, supra note 12 passim. Nowicki’s argument begins 
from the observation that there is a meaningful difference between “bad faith” and the ab-
sence of good faith. See Nowicki, Director’s Good Faith, supra, at 530. Acts taken in bad 
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bad faith.60 Disney V justified the knowledge-based distinction between 
conscious gross negligence and gross negligence based on the various 
legislative decisions—section 102(b)(7) in particular—indicating a 
need to separate duty of care cases with a gross negligence standard of 
review from good faith cases.61
 The Supreme Court again took up the issue of defining good faith 
in Stone v. Ritter.62 In doing so, it settled the “triad question” dis-
cussed above63 and approved of the Disney dicta regarding the con-
scious disregard species of good faith. As to the former, the court con-
cluded that the duty of good faith is not formally a coequal duty with 
care and loyalty.64 Nevertheless, by including the non-coextensive du-
ty of good faith within the duty of loyalty, Stone expanded the latter 
beyond its theretofore understood limits.65 As one set of commenta-
tors observed, Stone served as “a compromise between those scholars 
and jurists who wanted to elevate good faith to being part of a triad 
of fiduciary duties and those who did not, with the former losing as a 
matter of form, and the latter losing as a matter of substance.”66
 More important than establishing the status of good faith, Stone 
also outlined one set of circumstances in which the duty would be vi-
olated.67 The shareholder claim in Stone was a Caremark claim, i.e., a 
claim that the directors of AmSouth Bancorporation failed to proper-
                                                                                                                    
faith are an important subset of acts not taken in good faith, but not the exclusive one. Id.
at 526-27. Acting in good faith requires a range of actions that furthers the best interests 
of shareholders. Nowicki’s argument is strongest in the context of exculpation and indem-
nification, instances in which the Delaware legislature specifically used the terms “not in 
good faith” and “in good faith,” respectively. Requiring merely the absence of “bad faith” in 
those contexts plausibly adjusts the meaning of the statutes. Her argument appears weak-
er in the context of judicial explications of the business judgment rule, as described above. 
The use of “good faith” in Aronson, for instance, would be a thin reed on which to hang an 
affirmative “good faith” duty of the kind Nowicki advocates, especially in the light of other 
court decisions characterizing the duty as the avoidance of bad faith. See Griffith, supra
note 35, at 4 n.6. 
 60. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 64-66. 
 61. Id. at 65-66 (noting the need to distinguish good faith and due care under sections 
102(b)(7) and 145 of the DGCL). 
 62. 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
 63. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 65. But see Bainbridge et al., supra note 7, at 584-88 (criticizing this formulation and 
contending that liability for violations of good faith should require proof of causation of 
some harm to the corporation, an element not necessary in traditional duty of loyalty anal-
ysis). It is unclear, however, why each of the newly expanded group of loyalty violations, 
per se, must not require an element of causation. 
 66. Id. at 559. 
 67. The court was careful to note that its analysis did not exhaust the potential ways 
in which directors might fail to act in good faith. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (quoting Dis-
ney V); see also Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
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ly oversee the acts of the company’s employees.68 When the em-
ployees’ misbehavior resulted in a $50 million fine payable by the 
company, shareholders filed a derivative suit seeking payment by the 
directors (or, more likely, the D&O insurer) for the loss.  
 The court affirmed the test for good faith violations in the Care-
mark context, holding that directors could be liable via (1) an utter 
failure to implement any reporting system or controls or (2) a con-
scious failure to monitor or oversee even if such systems were nomi-
nally in place.69 More generally, Stone confirmed Disney’s conscious 
disregard standard of conduct for good faith,70 concluding that liabili-
ty requires a showing that directors failed to act in the face of a 
known duty to act.71
 After Stone then, we are left with at least two types of cases.72 First, 
clear Caremark/Stone, failure-to-monitor claims, for which Stone of-
fers a specific disjunctive test—absence of monitoring systems or con-
scious failure to monitor through such systems. Second, a more general 
standard—conscious disregard of the duty of care—that, depending 
upon its application, could seemingly transform ordinary and exculpa-
ble due care claims into nonexculpable good faith violations. The key 
practical question is how the conscious disregard standard is to be ap-
plied. The Stone court offered little guidance as to what needs to be 
demonstrated to prove that gross negligence was “conscious”.
C.   Exculpation Clauses and Good Faith in 2008 
 In the immediate aftermath of Stone, the Chancery Court’s resolu-
tion of conscious disregard claims was scattered. The first significant 
attempt to deal with the interplay of due care and good faith came in 
Vice Chancellor Noble’s decision in Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co.73 In 
the Chancery Court version of Lyondell, Vice Chancellor Noble denied 
a defendant board’s motion for summary judgment based on the com-
pany’s exculpation clause because a question existed as to whether the 
directors’ behavior rose to the level of a good faith violation.74 Within 
five weeks of the Lyondell decision, the Chancery Court handed down 
two other decisions in cases with somewhat similar fact patterns—
                                                                                                                    
 68. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 364. The employees in question failed to file suspicious ac-
tivity reports as required by law. These failures resulted in $50 million worth of penalties 
assessed upon AmSouth. 
 69. Id. at 370. 
 70. Id.
 71. Id.
 72. See Bainbridge et al., supra note 7, at 595-97 (characterizing the framework as 
one general type of case (due care) with a particular subset of such cases (duty to monitor)); 
see also Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755-56 (discussing the other alternatives, including the 
“anything else” catch-all that has generally not been discussed after Disney IV).
 73. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 WL 2923427, at *18-19 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2008). 
 74. Id. at *18-19. 
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McPadden v. Sidhu75 and In re Lear Shareholders Litigation76—and in 
both cases ruled that plaintiffs’ claims did not rise to the level of a good 
faith breach.77 Read together, the three decisions showed just how ar-
bitrary the conscious disregard standard had become. 
1.   Lyondell
 In spring 2007, Access Industries (Access), the sole owner of Basell 
AF, a Luxembourg-based manufacturing company, acquired a third 
party’s option to purchase an 8.3% interest in Lyondell Chemical 
Company (Lyondell), a Delaware chemical and refining concern. In 
conjunction with this transaction, Access filed a Schedule 13D indicat-
ing an interest in pursuing a more significant transaction with Lyon-
dell. Lyondell’s board met to discuss Access’ moves, ultimately deciding 
to wait and assess the general market reaction as well as the specific 
reaction of other potential suitors who were now on notice that Lyon-
dell was in play. Three days later, a private equity group approached 
Lyondell’s CEO concerning a potential management buyout of the 
company, which he rejected. No other solicitations were forthcoming.  
 For weeks, Lyondell’s CEO and his counterpart at Basell were un-
able to meet.78 During this period the Lyondell board had not taken 
active steps to establish the company’s true value or discussed poten-
tial steps to be taken in the likely event that Access/Basell ultimately 
made an offer. Finally, Access and Lyondell’s CEOs informally nego-
tiated a $48 per share price, conditioned on a one-week signing dead-
line and a $400 million termination fee. 
 The next day, Lyondell’s CEO brought this proposal to his board.79
During the meeting, which lasted less than an hour, the board dis-
cussed the proposed terms, valuation materials that had been com-
piled in the ordinary course of board business, and other potential 
suitors for Lyondell. Access had required that Lyondell’s board pro-
vide a “firm indication of interest” regarding Access’ terms before it 
would make a written offer.80 The Lyondell board met again and, af-
ter a forty-five minute meeting, agreed to indicate its interest and 
authorized the CEO to negotiate the final terms of the deal with 
Access/Basell. As part of the ensuing negotiations, the CEO sought a 
                                                                                                                    
 75. 964 A.2d 1262, 1264-68 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 76. 967 A.2d 640, 641-47 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 77. See In re Lear, 967 A.2d at 655; McPadden, 964 A.2d at 1275. 
 78. There was apparently some communication between the sides because internal 
Access/Basell emails indicated that Smith had told Basell that a $48 per Lyondell share 
price “would be ‘justified.’ ” 2008 WL 2923427, at *5. Nevertheless, the Lyondell board 
knew nothing of these contacts.  
 79. The eleven-person board consisted of ten independent outside directors. 
 80. Access/Basell was choosing between two potential acquisitions—Lyondell and 
Huntsman Corporation—and had a deadline with respect to the latter that it needed to address. 
2010]                         OPTING OUT OF GOOD FAITH 409 
price increase, a go-shop provision coupled with a reduced termina-
tion fee in the event of a topping bid, and a reduction of the original 
termination fee. Other than reducing the termination fee by $15 mil-
lion, Access declined to renegotiate the deal’s terms.  
 During the week after indicating its interest in the Access deal, 
the board retained Deutsche Bank to render a fairness opinion re-
garding the offer. Deutsche Bank did not solicit other bidders, al-
though it evaluated alternative suitors. The board met again that 
week and once more at week’s end to discuss the deal. At the final 
meeting, the board discussed the deal and received advice from both 
legal counsel and its financial advisors who deemed the $48 price fair 
and likely to be the best offer coming. At the end of this meeting, the 
board unanimously approved the deal. When put to Lyondell share-
holders, 99.33% of the shares voted were voted in favor of the deal.81
 After the merger was completed, a shareholder class brought an ac-
tion claiming, inter alia, the Lyondell board breached its Revlon82 du-
ties. Revlon generally requires that boards choose the highest offer in 
certain control transactions, and as part of that obligation, it imposes a 
duty on the board to take active steps in those situations to maximize 
shareholder value.83 Of course, the requisite board activity will be fact-
specific, and most sales processes will pass muster. One example of 
courts’ deference on this point is that well-informed boards may pur-
sue a single-bidder strategy.84 Revlon’s procedural requirements are 
nothing more than a species of the duty of care, so, aside from in-
stances of preferring one bidder to another, being in Revlon-land does 
not fundamentally change the impact of exculpation clauses. In Lyon-
dell, plaintiffs were faced with an independent board and Lyondell’s 
full section 102(b)(7) clause, leaving only a good faith claim available.85
Consequently, they were forced to contend that the board had con-
sciously breached its duty of care under Revlon to proceed in a manner 
reasonably designed to achieve the best available transaction.86   
 As to whether the board violated its duty of care, the court held 
that, at the very least, summary judgment was not appropriate, find-
ing that, on the available evidence, there remained a question of fact 
as to the Lyondell board’s satisfaction of its duty of care under Rev-
lon.87 The court’s analysis focused on the board’s behavior during the 
                                                                                                                    
 81. The combined company has since filed for bankruptcy. See Ana Campoy & Marie 
Beaudette, Lyondell’s U.S. Arm in Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at B2. 
 82. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).  
 83. Id. at 182-85. 
 84. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1288 (Del. 1989). 
 85. Plaintiffs made the claim that the accelerated vesting of the independent directors 
equity by virtue of the deal with Access/Basell rendered the directors interested. Vice 
Chancellor Noble rejected this claim, however. See 2008 WL 2923427, at *10. 
 86. See id. at *11. 
 87. Id. at *16. 
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period after the filing of the Schedule 13D by Access but prior to the 
negotiation of the Access/Basell deal.88 It also addressed the Ba-
sell/Lyondell negotiation process—the quickness with which the deal 
was negotiated,89 the failure of Lyondell to wring concessions from 
Basell,90 the value of the post-signing market check opportunity pro-
vided in the deal,91 and the deal protections generally.92 Even though 
the opinion discussed the Basell/Lyondell negotiations, after reading 
it one is left with the impression that any hope for summary judg-
ment in favor of the board was lost once it remained passive during 
the period leading up to those negotiations. On this point, the court 
found that the board could have known the company was likely to be 
sold once Access filed its Form 13D.93 Yet, the board did not retain an 
investment banker to prepare valuation materials and did not can-
vass the market for other potential bidders. Those failures essentially 
sunk any attempt by the Lyondell board to engage in a single-bidder 
strategy in which the bidder demanded even typical deal protections, 
regardless of the premium offered.  
 Vice Chancellor Noble’s holding on this count was not unqualified. 
The opinion admitted that the Lyondell board was “active, sophisti-
cated and generally aware” of the company’s value and the state of 
the market and, therefore, may not have had to conduct a market 
check to satisfy its Revlon duties under the Barkan exception.94 It 
noted that the board was “routinely advised” of the company’s finan-
cial situation and had recently been involved in the purchase of a 
partner’s interest in a joint venture, evidence that the board was fa-
                                                                                                                    
 88. Id. at *15. 
 89. Regarding the negotiations, Vice Chancellor Noble was concerned that the board 
approved the deal after only one week, during which it spent no more than six or seven 
hours in deliberations. Noble admitted that a one-week period was not a problem per se,
but found that the condensed time frame “[did] not inspire confidence that the [b]oard care-
fully considered all of the alternatives available to [the company].” Id. at *14. 
 90. Id. at *15. 
 91. Id. The fiduciary out to the deal’s no-shop provision the board did receive in the 
deal could not be given very much credit for Revlon purposes because the board had not 
conducted a prior market check and had not wrung any significant concessions from 
Access/Basell in exchange for agreeing to pursue a single-bidder strategy. The court’s anal-
ysis here would seem to effectively preclude reliance on a go-shop provision in all circums-
tances. The point of the go-shop provision is to provide a post hoc market check. It is un-
clear why a pre-deal market check should be necessary to validate the effectiveness of a 
post-deal market check unless the deal protections granted to the first bidder pose a “for-
midable barrier” to later bidders. See id.
 92. Vice Chancellor Noble concedes that the deal protections employed in the Lyon-
dell/Basell deal were “typical.” Id. Nevertheless, the deal protections were problematic be-
cause the Lyondell board did not fight very hard against them and “there [was] no persua-
sive evidence . . . that Basell was going to walk away from the deal if it did not receive all 
the protections it demanded.” Id. at *17.  
 93. Indeed, the Lyondell board made the case that the market knew the company was 
in play because of the 13D and that as a result, they were justified in not doing a market 
check that was already effectively in progress simply via market forces.  
 94. Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *13. 
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miliar with the valuation of a “substantial segment” of the compa-
ny.95 And, of course, Access had filed its Form 13D on May 11 and on-
ly one other bidder had emerged in two month’s time. One might 
think, in the light of all of these facts, that the board was justified in 
being somewhat “languid” during the post-13D period.96 At one point 
Vice Chancellor Noble even stated that “the better inference, espe-
cially considering the potential consequences from losing the Basell 
Proposal” was that the board satisfied its duty of care under Revlon.97
 Even assuming that the Lyondell board breached its duty of care 
under Revlon in a reasonably close call (the closeness being driven by 
the deferential standard for summary judgment motions), the crucial 
question remained whether the evidence allowed for the conclusion 
that it had consciously violated that duty. Specifically, did the Lyon-
dell directors know (1) what was required of them and (2) that they 
were failing to meet those obligations? Given the summary judgment 
evidence, the court refused to say no. In a surprisingly short four-
paragraph discussion of the issue,98 the court cited the Stone con-
scious disregard standard and purported to apply it to the facts of 
Lyondell. Restating that the board failed to engage in a robust sales 
process, the court refused to conclude that the board did not con-
sciously violate its duty of care.99
 One fascinating part of these four paragraphs is what the court 
does not restate from its due care analysis. That earlier analysis, as 
discussed above, went to great lengths to point out that the board 
may very well have satisfied its duty of care under Revlon. The board 
was generally well-informed about the company, its financial state, 
and the market. The company had been publicly “in play” and had 
not attracted other bidders. Basell had offered a premium twenty 
percent higher than its original offer after negotiations with Smith, 
which the board monitored. Basell had demanded, and Lyondell had 
accepted, deal protections that were typical. Yet the court made no 
mention in the opinion’s “good faith” section of the “better” inference 
of the board’s nonnegligence, let alone its good faith. 
 The absence of a different analysis for good faith indicated that, at 
least during pretrial stages, the issue of conscious disregard was 
completely coextensive with the issue of due care. Assuming a breach 
of due care, the decision required nothing more for plaintiffs to suc-
cessfully show a conscious breach of due care. The test for conscious 
disregard was the test for due care.
                                                                                                                    
 95. Id.
 96. Id. at *14. 
 97. Id. at *16 n.92. 
 98. Id. at *18-19. 
 99. Id. at *19. 
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2.   McPadden
Lyondell demonstrated that no obvious mechanism existed for ef-
fectively separating due care claims from good faith claims. Pre-
sented with the question, the Chancery Court erred on the side of 
conflating the two analyses—good faith was no more or less than due 
care. One month later, Chancellor Chandler issued his opinion in 
McPadden v. Sidhu, similarly demonstrating the absence of a method 
for separating due care from conscious disregard.100 In McPadden,
however, the court responded by making it virtually impossible to 
prove conscious disregard at all.  
 The facts of the case are roughly as follows: i2 Technologies, Inc., a 
supply chain software company, owned a subsidiary, Trade Services 
Corporation (TSC). In 2003, a TSC competitor had offered $25 million 
for TSC, although nothing ever came of the bid. Later, Dubreville, 
the CEO of the i2 division containing TSC, discussed a potential 
management-led buyout of TSC with the i2 board. Despite this ap-
parent conflict of interest, the i2 board charged Dubreville with run-
ning the TSC sale process when it ultimately decided to sell the sub-
sidiary in 2004.  
 As part of the sale process, i2 had prepared an offering memoran-
dum for TSC. After Dubreville was appointed to lead the sale process, 
the offering memorandum was amended and its financial projections 
for TSC were substantially reduced. Although he knew about the 
competitor’s 2003 bid, Dubreville did not approach the competitor as 
part of the process nor did he contact any other TSC competitors. In 
the end, the sale process run by Dubreville resulted in three bids, in-
cluding one from a consortium led by Dubreville. Despite the fact 
that the $3 million price was at the low end of the already-reduced 
financial projections, the i2 board authorized i2 management to nego-
tiate a deal with Dubreville’s team, which was completed successful-
ly. In the same year that the i2-Dubreville group deal closed, the 
competitor that had offered $25 million for TSC in 2003 offered the 
Dubreville group $18.5 million for the company. Despite having paid 
only $3 million for the company months earlier, Dubreville rejected 
this offer as being inadequate and eventually sold the company two 
years later for $25 million. 
 i2 shareholders sued claiming that the i2 board failed to exercise 
due care in selling the subsidiary. The court held that the plaintiffs 
had sufficiently pleaded a violation of the board’s duty of care so as to 
make demand futile.101 i2’s charter contained an exculpation provi-
sion, however, so once again the operative question was whether the 
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duty of care claim rose to the level of a good faith claim. On this is-
sue, the court divided due care claims into two categories: conscious 
disregard of one’s responsibilities and “reckless indifference or ac-
tions that are without the bounds of reason.”102 The former showed a 
lack of good faith, the latter merely a lack of due care.103
 As far as actually distinguishing between the standards it called 
out—recklessness and conscious disregard—the opinion was less 
than helpful. The analysis reads in its entirety as follows: 
The conduct of the Director Defendants here fits precisely within 
this revised understanding of gross negligence [i.e., solely due care 
violation]. . . . [F]or the reasons explained above, the Director De-
fendants’ actions, beginning with placing Dubreville in charge of 
the sale process of TSC and continuing through their failure to act 
in any way so as to ensure that the sale process employed was tho-
rough and complete, are properly characterized as either recklessly 
indifferent or unreasonable. Plaintiff has not, however, sufficiently 
alleged that the Director Defendants acted in bad faith through a 
conscious disregard for their duties. Instead, plaintiff has ably 
pleaded that the Director Defendants quite clearly were not care-
ful enough in the discharge of their duties—that is, they acted 
with gross negligence or else reckless indifference.104
It is challenging to imagine what the i2 board could have done more 
poorly so as to rise to the level of consciously disregarding its duties. 
Perhaps the court required a showing of actual “consciousness”—a 
smoking gun email or memo—but it does not say so explicitly. To the 
extent that it required such evidence, the McPadden decision would 
make it impossible to demonstrate conscious disregard, thereby nulli-
fying Disney and Stone.
3.   In re Lear
 Five days after the McPadden decision, Vice Chancellor Strine is-
sued an unpublished opinion in In re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litiga-
tion.105  In that decision, he went further than McPadden in spelling 
out why the space between due care violations and good faith viola-
tions must be protected.106 However, he gave little guidance to anyone 
as to how that space could or could not be bridged.  
 Lear Corp. shareholders sued the board for agreeing to an in-
creased termination fee pursuant to negotiations with a purchaser in 
exchange for a purchase price increase. Lear shareholders had voted 
down the deal, triggering the increased breakup fee. The complaint 
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 105. 967 A.2d 640 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 106. See id. at 652. 
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alleged that the board knew or should have known that the share-
holders would vote down the deal even at the increased price, and 
therefore that the board violated its duties by agreeing to the en-
hanced breakup fee.107
 Vice Chancellor Strine took some pains to recognize the problem of 
distinguishing gross negligence from conscious gross negligence: 
When a discrete transaction is under consideration, a board will 
always face the question of how much process should be devoted to 
that transaction given its overall importance in light of the myriad 
of other decisions the board must make. Seizing specific opportuni-
ties is an important business skill, and that involves some meas-
ure of risk. Boards may have to choose between acting rapidly to 
seize a valuable opportunity without the luxury of months, or even 
weeks, of deliberation—such as a large premium offer—or losing it 
altogether. Likewise, a managerial commitment to timely decision 
making is likely to have systemic benefits but occasionally result 
in certain decisions being made that, with more time, might have 
come out differently. Courts should therefore be extremely chary 
about labeling what they perceive as deficiencies in the delibera-
tions of an independent board majority over a discrete transaction 
as not merely negligence or even gross negligence, but as involving 
bad faith. In the transactional context, a very extreme set of facts 
would seem to be required to sustain a disloyalty claim premised 
on the notion that disinterested directors were intentionally disre-
garding their duties. Where, as here, the board employed a special 
committee that met frequently, hired reputable advisors, and met 
frequently itself, a Caremark-based liability theory is untenable.108
The final sentence of the passage indicated that the conscious disre-
gard standard should only be applicable in the Caremark failure-to-
monitor context. If so, the decision’s limitation of Stone was puzzling. 
Stone certainly confirmed the Caremark standard for failure-to-
monitor cases; however, beyond Caremark cases, Stone establishes a 
broader application—directors’ conscious disregard of any duty. 
Moreover, Disney, which was unequivocally affirmed by Stone, in-
volved a discrete transaction not a failure to monitor.  
 Perhaps it is best to read out “Caremark” in the final sentence and 
replace it with “conscious disregard,” such that, given a strong 
process, a conscious disregard liability theory is untenable. Similar to 
Lyondell, In re Lear was an easy conscious disregard decision because 
there was arguably not even an underlying due care violation.109 Un-
like Lyondell or McPadden, however, the decision explicitly ad-
dressed the gross negligence/good faith distinction by recommending 
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“chariness.” Ultimately though, In re Lear proved unhelpful as it 
gave no indication as to how to actually be “chary.” If, for instance, 
“chariness” essentially meant that courts should not impose liability 
under almost any circumstances outside of the Caremark context, 
then the opinion is hardly different than McPadden.
III.   THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTINGUISHING DUE CARE VIOLATIONS 
FROM GOOD FAITH VIOLATIONS
A.   The Problem with the Chancery Court Opinion in Lyondell
 When the decision in Lyondell was issued, corporate law scholars 
reacted immediately.110 Jeff Lipshaw noted that Lyondell “present[ed] 
precisely the Smith v. Van Gorkom factual scenario that 102(b)(7) 
was intended to address,”111 given the factual similarities between 
Lyondell and Van Gorkom. Indeed, it is likely that, if written imme-
diately following enactment of section 102(b)(7), Vice Chancellor 
Noble’s decision would have dismayed Delaware legislators. The 
Lyondell directors were certainly more diligent in running their sale 
process than the directors of Trans Union had been. They engaged in 
bargaining and had a sense of industry market values based on re-
cent acquisition activity. The “for sale” sign had been up on the com-
pany for a fairly long time prior to the Basell deal. Thus, if the Trans 
Union directors acted in good faith—necessarily so if section 102(b)(7) 
was intended as a response to Van Gorkom—and the Trans Union di-
rectors were less attentive than the Lyondell directors, how could the 
Chancery Court have even considered the claim that the Lyondell di-
rectors acted in bad faith? 
 The answer is that objecting to Vice Chancellor Noble’s opinion on 
the basis that the facts in Lyondell were no worse than those in Van 
Gorkom misses the subjective component of the conscious disregard 
standard. That standard turns on a director’s knowledge that he or she 
is disregarding his or her duties as a director. This allows for different 
good faith outcomes, given similar behavior, once director duties have 
changed or have become clearer. To the extent that directors’ duties in 
                                                                                                                    
 110. See, e.g., Posting of Gordon Smith to The Conglomerate, Boosters of “The Fiduciary 
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31, 2008). 
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the face of an all-cash buyout were either different or more widely un-
derstood at the time of the Lyondell sale than those at the time of the 
Trans Union sale, less negligent directors in Lyondell may have none-
theless better known that they were failing to fulfill their fiduciary du-
ties. Thus, the conscious disregard standard allows postadoption 
changes to fiduciary duty doctrine to effectively restrict the impact of 
an exculpation clause. Absent proof that the Delaware legislature in 
1986 thought that good faith did not prohibit something like conscious 
disregard, there can be no conclusive argument against a liberal appli-
cation of the standard based on legislative intent.  
 Yet there remained reason to be troubled by the decision. If 
shareholders’ decisions to adopt exculpation clauses after Van Gor-
kom ought to be respected, the key question becomes what share-
holders thought they were agreeing to at the time of adoption. As dis-
cussed in Part I.B., no one, including shareholders, really knew what 
good faith meant during the fifteen years between the adoption of 
section 102(b)(7) and the Disney and Stone decisions. However, the 
conscious disregard standard, for as long as it had existed, was un-
derstood to be a duty of care standard.112 That is, decisions to adopt 
exculpation clauses before 2003 (the time of the relevant iteration of 
Disney) appear to have revealed preferences for exculpating directors 
with respect to admittedly nascent conscious disregard claims. The 
ease with which Lyondell allowed due care, gross negligence claims 
to be bootstrapped into good faith, conscious gross negligence claims 
flew in the face of those revealed preferences. 
 In addition to frustrating the intent of already-adopted exculpation 
clauses, the Chancery Court’s Lyondell decision posed problems for ex-
culpation clauses yet to be adopted. If permissible due care exculpation 
is justifiable at all,113 its utility is largely based on the ability of legal 
professionals to predict which types of claims will be exculpable in any 
given instance. If due care derivative suits are an inefficient accounta-
bility mechanism,114 it is key that due care claims not be smuggled in 
under a different name. If the issue of potential due care liability 
merely ought to be available for shareholders and management to ad-
dress as they see fit, effective private ordering requires reasonably 
well-defined options. When it is impossible to distinguish whether a 
set of claims is exculpable or nonexculpable, whatever promise an opt-
out regime has is compromised. If exculpation clauses are to be taken 
seriously, then the conscious disregard test’s potential overinclusive-
ness—sweeping in claims that are properly due care claims either di-
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rectly through an overinclusive bright-line rule or indirectly through 
application of a vague rule—is harmful. 
B.   Caring About Exculpation Clauses 
 As a preliminary matter, it is important to assess whether due care 
exculpation clauses deserve deference. There are at least two related 
but distinct arguments in favor of permitting the adoption of exculpa-
tion clauses. The first is the strong claim that due care exculpation is, 
under most observed conditions, the optimal arrangement across 
firms. The second, weaker claim is that even if one is unsure about the 
desirability of due care exculpation for any given company, a properly 
contractarian view of the corporation leads to permissible opting out of 
director liability for monetary damages in duty of care cases.115
1.   Exculpation Is Generally Optimal 
 Directors almost never pay out-of-pocket monetary damages for 
duty of care breaches.116 This is a result of restrictive liability stan-
dards (a robust business judgment rule), procedural requirements for 
derivative suits (the demand requirement enforced before discovery), 
and various extra-legal devices (including corporation-purchased in-
surance117 and exculpation clauses).118 The business judgment rule, 
while the subject of some controversy,119 codifies the policy judgment 
that a stricter negligence regime would be suboptimal for sharehold-
ers.120 But it operates within litigation, meaning even a diminished 
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acted in good faith and not in opposition to the corporation’s best interests.  See id.
 119. See, e.g., D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Ex-
ecutive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 886 (2007). 
 120. The business judgment rule may be justified by, among other things, a lack of in-
stitutional competence on the part of courts to review board decisions, the potential for 
hindsight bias, and the desirability of board risk-taking. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The 
Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV.
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expectation of liability for due care violations is likely to be a signifi-
cant risk for individual directors.121
 Accordingly, corporations indemnify and insure directors against 
liability and litigation costs. In fact, the vast majority of companies 
purchase policies insuring both directors against liability risk and 
the companies themselves for reimbursements paid to directors un-
der indemnification agreements. These policies do not cover all 
claims against directors, often excluding coverage for certain kinds of 
liability, notably fraud and self-dealing.122 Although insurance pro-
tects directors reasonably well, it costs the corporation money and 
depends on the existence of counterparties willing to insure against 
the liability risk. Thus, the ability to insure for duty of care violations 
is bound to be more tenuous if liability risk is high. It is not clear how 
much the Van Gorkom decision had to do with the insurance crisis in 
the mid-1980s,123 but it stands to reason that either greater uncer-
tainty over liability risk or a known increase in liability risk will im-
pact the insurance market and drive rates higher.  
 The problems with shareholder suits are exacerbated by certain 
features unique to them that provide fertile ground for nuisance 
suits. In particular, nonmeritorious suits are encouraged by the re-
liance on entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ attorneys124 and the significant 
incentives of all sides to settle even nonmeritorious litigation given 
D&O insurance and the limitations placed on director indemnifica-
tion in adjudicated suits.125 D&O insurers do not control the litigation 
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Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: 
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 12-27 (1991). 
 125. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 69 (1991); see also Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New 
Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 
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process126 and relatively rarely prevent boards from settling deriva-
tive suits.127 For boards, the decision to settle even meritless suits is 
almost costless, save for potentially increased insurance premiums 
which will, in any event, be passed on to shareholders. Understand-
ing this, the plaintiffs’ lawyer will naturally be encouraged to file 
more nonmeritorious claims than otherwise in the hope of scoring a 
quick settlement. 
 As a protection against nonmeritorious due care claims, exculpa-
tion clauses have significantly different consequences than does in-
surance.128 As a general matter, any decrease in liability risk will si-
milarly decrease the corporation’s cost of insuring against it. Excul-
pation clauses shape the insurance market by lowering the cost of in-
suring directors to the extent the clauses predictably reduce the lia-
bility risk. Moreover, exculpation clauses, which provide decisive pro-
tection for directors, minimize the incentives for nuisance suits 
created by D&O insurance. Regarding only the cost side, exculpation 
clauses are preferable to insurance from a firm’s perspective insofar 
as it will not have to pay any portion of a premium allocated to the 
risk of the exculpated liability.  
 But there is another side of the story—the disciplining effect of fi-
duciary duty liability. Here, exculpation arguably eliminates any in-
centives for good behavior provided by potential liability. On the oth-
er hand, insurance has likely already done the same thing. D&O poli-
cies offer little in the way of protection from moral hazard.129 Deduc-
tibles for Side A coverage (covering losses directly borne by directors 
or officers) exist in certain cases but are generally low.130 Side A poli-
cies have coverage limits, though almost all claims settle within the 
policy limits as directors, plaintiffs, and insurers have incentives to 
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settle within those limits.131 D&O policies exclude certain claims from 
coverage, but not strictly due care claims. Thus, given generally ob-
served insurance conditions, potential personal liability does not nec-
essarily drive ex ante director behavior. If that is so, a move to due 
care exculpation can do little harm to directors’ incentives to be non-
negligent. As a result, given any gains produced by exculpation in the 
way of reducing litigation costs, let alone the substantial ones de-
scribed above, due care exculpation should always be superior to due 
care insurance from a firm’s perspective.132
 Even in a world where D&O insurance is less complete, due care 
exculpation may prove to be value-maximizing. Given gaps in insur-
ance, the incentives to bring meritless claims may be reduced. On the 
other hand, the potential for random and uninsurable liability is 
more likely to cause potential directors to avoid serving on boards, 
require significantly greater fees to compensate for the risk,133 or 
cause boards to be overly risk averse. The advisability of exculpation 
in a world without insurance turns, in large part, on how random and 
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 133. This was the case made in favor of section 102(b)(7).  
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hindsight-biased the uninsurable liability risk would be, bringing one 
back to the question of uncertainty.134
 On this, there is some evidence that due care exculpation is a net 
positive for shareholders. Event studies concerning Delaware excul-
pation clauses have been something of a mixed bag.135 Depending 
upon the interval surrounding the announcement of a charter 
amendment proposal, studies found everything from significant posi-
tive returns to significant negative returns.136 More anecdotally, in-
stitutional shareholders and shareholder advisory firms have not 
made a serious call for the repeal of exculpatory clauses. These firms 
have significantly different incentives for monitoring and prodding 
firms than do small shareholders, and they have increasingly de-
manded action on a broad range of corporate governance matters in-
cluding separation of the CEO and chairman of the board,137 share-
holder say regarding shark repellants such as poison pills,138 majority 
voting,139 board declassification,140 limits on executive compensa-
tion,141 and shareholder advisory votes on executive compensation.142
While many of these groups’ voting policies officially oppose due care 
exculpation provisions,143 they have yet to mount any push for their 
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negative returns over a seven-day interval); Yaron Brook & Ramesh K. S. Rao, Sharehold-
er Wealth Effects of Directors’ Liability Limitation Provisions, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 481, 490 (1994) (showing insignificant positive returns over four-day interval); 
Vahan Janjigian & P.J. Bolster, The Elimination of Director Liability and Stockholder Re-
turns: An Empirical Investigation, 3 J. FIN. RESEARCH 53, 53-60 (1990) (showing insignifi-
cant returns); Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: 
The Recent Experience, 19 FIN. MANAGEMENT 29, 29-40 (1989) (showing insignificant re-
turns); Romano, supra note 18, at 1183-87 (showing significant positive returns over two-, 
three-, and five-day intervals). Given the well-publicized nature of section 102(b)(7) and 
the tendency of firms to make the proposal in the context of their regularly scheduled 1987 
shareholder meeting, any significance of the actual announcement is somewhat surprising. 
 137. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY 2009 UPDATES 12 
(2008), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMG2009PolicyUpdate 
UnitedStates.pdf. 
 138. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2008 POSTSEASON REPORT SUMMARY 7 (2008). 
 139. Id.
 140. Id.
 141. Id. at 5-6. 
 142. Id. at 5. 
 143. See RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2009 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 13 
(2008), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/RMG2009Summary 
GuidelinesUnitedStates.pdf. 
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repeal, nor is there any evidence of more informal pressure.144 This 
provides some powerful circumstantial evidence that shareholder 
groups’ stated policies on exculpation clauses are more strategic than 
substantive and mass adoption of the clauses reflects their efficiency. 
2.   Exculpation Clauses Are Attractive as a Matter of 
Contractarian Principle 
 The more familiar and slightly weaker argument in favor of allow-
ing adoption of exculpation clauses involves a retreat to contractarian 
principles. For contractarians, the corporation is a collection of con-
tracts among its constituencies, in particular shareholders and man-
agers.145 Promoters or managers have significant incentives to offer 
governance mechanisms that shareholders demand, through the re-
duced cost of capital for promoters and postcharter market con-
straints for managers. Because the parties can therefore be trusted to 
bargain their way to an efficient solution and because mandatory 
rules may otherwise frustrate those negotiations, contractarians gen-
erally believe that corporate law should consist of a set of default 
rules. Yet even the most ardent “deregulators”146 recognize that mar-
ket failures in the negotiating process between shareholders and 
managers, if proven, should temper any move to a completely unfet-
tered freedom of contract.147 The presumption of efficiency resulting 
from private ordering is lost when market failure exists, potentially 
bringing mandatory rules back into play.148
                                                                                                                    
 144. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 135, at 392-93 (“But [a study showing that 
shareholders vote for adverse management-sponsored proposals] investigated manage-
ment-sponsored proposals related to takeover defenses, proposals that institutional inves-
tors have vigorously opposed in the same time period in which they have supported the li-
mited liability provisions.”). Additionally, in my informal conversations with some key poli-
cymakers in these firms, each agreed that exculpation clauses were not seen to be trouble-
some by activist shareholders.  
 145. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A 
Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1419-21 (1989). 
 146. This was the name Lucian Bebchuk gave to proponents of the more extreme ver-
sion of the freedom-to-contract view. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual 
Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1399 (1989). 
 147. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 145 passim (defending freedom to contract only 
after responding to objections that intracorporation contracts were not efficient). 
 148. For more on the debate over the mandatory versus nonmandatory nature of corpo-
rate law, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW, 1-39 (Foundation Press 1991); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivi-
al?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 567-68 (1990). See generally
Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in 
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Melvin 
Avron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989); Jeff-
rey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989); 
Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corpo-
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 At the incorporation stage, for instance, it could be that potential 
investors do not have the practical ability to negotiate over exculpa-
tion clauses.149 Nevertheless, that inability is only troubling if inves-
tors also have no ability to price such clauses.150 If, instead, investors 
can accurately value the agency problems unleashed by limiting due 
care liability, then the promoters should bear those costs. If the value 
of exculpation to the promoter is greater than the price reduction re-
quired by the investor, then it will be efficient to adopt the clause.151
And if this process of investigation and implicit negotiation can be 
accomplished cheaply, default rules make sense.152
 It seems likely that investors are able to put a price on a due care 
exculpatory clause, i.e., there is little risk for “informational imper-
fections.”153 First, an exculpatory clause is necessarily in plain sight 
in the charter.154 For a similarly public charter provision—dual stock 
classifications—empirical evidence has shown that “market prices 
adjust to reflect significant variations in charter provisions.”155
Second, there appears to be little evidence of any insurmountable in-
formation asymmetry among directors and investors with respect to 
directors’ potential gross negligence. This differs from duty of loyalty 
violations which are more likely to be the subject of specific planning 
by the board. Third, with respect to due care exculpation clauses, 
there is little novel at this point in time that might make it difficult 
                                                                                                                    
rate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599 (1989). Ultimately, the mandatory versus nonmandato-
ry question for contractarians is a consequentialist one. See Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate 
Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185, 187 (1993) 
(stating the problem as “whether the benefits of a set of mandatory corporate law rules—
such as the benefits that come in the form of reduced agency costs—are greater than the 
costs associated with those rules”). 
 149. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Con-
tract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1427 n.60 (1985). 
 150. See Gordon, supra note 148, at 1556. 
 151. See id. at 1562-64. 
 152. Blair and Stout express concerns about allowing firms to opt out of the duty of 
loyalty, namely that the lack of trust engendered by permissible opting out will increase 
the cost of gathering information to potential investors. See Blair & Stout, supra note 115, 
at 1787-89. They contend that this focus on trust relationships supports the “anticontrac-
tarian” position espoused by Tamar Frankel, among others. See id. at 1789. It seems, 
though, that the argument from the cost of diminished trust is an explicitly “contractarian” 
one with a baseline in favor of default rules subject to the possibility of transaction costs 
and/or market failure. In any event, Blair and Stout’s argument seems limited to the duty 
of loyalty and to complete opting out, as opposed to mere exculpation for monetary damag-
es. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
 153. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The 
Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1825-26 (1989) 
(accepting the efficiency of unfettered freedom to construct the corporate contract if no in-
formational asymmetry or externalities exist).  
 154. See Macey, supra note 148, at 188 (“A charter term that significantly affected risk 
or return should be noticed by the informed investor, in the same way that any other busi-
ness factor would be noticed. . . .” (quoting Gordon, supra note 148, at 1562)). 
 155. See id. at 188 (summarizing the research of Ronald Lease regarding stock issued 
with limiting voting rights). 
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for investors to price them.156 Finally, once a price is put on the 
clause by the market generally, even those unsophisticated investors 
who were not able to do so initially are able to understand its cost, 
assuming little firm-specific variation. In sum, it is hard to under-
stand why corporations ought to be prevented from opting out of the 
duty of care in their initial period. 
 The analysis may be materially different for midstream charter 
amendments. While it may be fair to view the provisions of a corpora-
tion’s initial charter as having been consented to by all investors, 
that view is not possible with respect to charter amendments.157
These amendments do not require unanimous approval by share-
holders,158 nor could they if the amendment process is to be of any 
practical use.159 As a result, any general reliance on bargaining by 
each shareholder to ensure an efficient outcome is not available in 
the midstream amendment context.160
 Nor is the shareholder vote requirement for charter amendments 
necessarily sufficient to restore confidence in the optimality of all 
charter amendments. Amendments may be initiated only by the 
board, not shareholders, who are left only with the ability to veto the 
board’s proposal. Yet, small shareholders are rationally apathetic. In-
forming themselves about a proposed amendment imposes the costs 
of gathering and processing information about the amendment. 
While those costs may or may not be significant, when presented 
with a proposed amendment, shareholders are also likely to discount 
their votes’ ability to have an effect on the amendment’s passage, and 
diversified shareholders will subsequently discount any potential 
benefit of investigation by the small piece of any gain realized by vot-
ing for the value-maximizing option.161 It may be that the true inci-
dence of shareholders’ deliberate indifference to charter amendments 
is overstated.162 Nevertheless, midstream charter amendments are 
worrisome enough to require closer examination. 
                                                                                                                    
 156. See J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only in: Contractarians, Waiv-
er of Liability Provisions, and the Race to the Bottom, 42 IND. L. REV. 285, 310 (2009) (noting 
that exculpation clauses almost uniformly exculpate the maximum extent permissible). This 
uniformity of adoption has implications for any argument against permissible exculpation 
from network and learning effects. See infra notes 172-77 and accompanying text. 
 157. This is not to say that charter amendments are not contractual arrangements. In 
fact, the initial charter, which cannot be complete, defines the substantive and procedural 
requirements on charter amendments, and those amendments, assuming they have com-
plied with those requirements, become part of the contract that is the charter. 
 158. See DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2006). 
 159. See Bebchuk, supra note 153, at 1830. 
 160. See id. at 1828; Gordon, supra note 148, at 1573. 
 161. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 153, at 1836-37; Gordon, supra note 148, at 1575. 
 162. See Romano, supra note 148, at 1607. Alternatively, ignorant shareholders may 
find that a mixed approach to voting on all amendment proposals is preferable, thus limit-
ing the number of value-decreasing amendments. See id. at 1608-10. 
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 Lucian Bebchuk has argued that the key data point for this analy-
sis should be the size of any potential wealth redistribution from the 
corporation and shareholders to the group of managers who propose 
the amendment.163 Because market constraints on managerial oppor-
tunism exist, value-decreasing amendments that are only slightly re-
distributive are unlikely to be proposed by managers.164 However, be-
cause those constraints are relatively weak, value-decreasing 
amendments that are significantly redistributive may very well be 
proposed by managers.165 As an example of the latter, Bebchuk ob-
serves that managerial self-dealing is so potentially redistributive 
that allowing corporations to opt out of the duty of loyalty through 
midstream charter amendment would be unwise.166
 Managerial negligence, even gross negligence, is qualitatively dif-
ferent. A violation of the duty of care will not normally result in a 
significant windfall for a director. Of course, negligence does result in 
something of a windfall for directors insofar as they are able to retain 
the value of their time and concentration that would otherwise be 
spent on the company’s business.167 But that diversion of firm value 
to the director seems to be the epitome of a “slight redistribution.”168
Alternatively, if one were to take a fully enforced duty of care for 
granted, exculpation from due care liability might itself be a signifi-
cant redistribution away from the company and toward directors. 
However, the ubiquity of directors’ insurance for due care breaches 
limits that liability to rare claims over policy limits, and the share-
holders will generally bear the cost of any recovery through increased 
premiums. Thus, little if any company value is diverted to directors 
through due care exculpation. 
 In addition to the relative size of potential redistribution to man-
agers, Bebchuk suggests an inquiry into the generalizability of the 
issue at hand. The more similar a term’s application across firms, the 
less likely it is that permitting firms to opt out of a rule will provide 
                                                                                                                    
 163. See Bebchuk, supra note 153, at 1841. 
 164. See id.
 165. See id. at 1841-46. On the whole, however, the larger the redistribution to manag-
ers becomes, the greater the likelihood of detection by even rationally apathetic sharehold-
ers. See Romano, supra note 148, at 1610-11. Thus, the potential for trouble seems to exist 
in a middle area of high but disguisable redistribution from the company to the managers. 
 166. See Bebchuk, supra note 153, at 1850. 
 167. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias,
32 J. CORP. L. 833, 855 (2007). 
 168. Along this line, market constraints may effectively regulate directors’ care. See
Thompson, supra note 8, at 408-09 (concluding that the product, capital, and corporate 
control markets arguably provide a greater check on due care violations than they do with 
respect to loyalty violations). 
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benefits.169 On this score, the appropriateness of due care exculpation 
will likely not vary significantly across firms.170
 For Bebchuk’s generalizability factor to make sense, however, one 
must assume that the adopted generalizable rule is also the optimal 
one.171 If rule X is generally preferable to a satisfactory degree over 
rule Y, it may be that there are few benefits derived from allowing 
companies to opt out of rule X. But what if the legislature or the 
courts might adopt rule Y?172 In that case, making the rule a default 
rule is crucial, even if there is likely to be little difference of opinion 
over the issue of due care liability among firms. If the duty of care, 
including all of the incentives and disincentives it provides for vari-
ous actors, is on the whole suboptimal,173 it would be good to effect a 
legislative or jurisprudential change to the duty or the enforcement 
mechanisms accompanying it. But if there is reason to doubt that the 
change will occur, making the rule a default rule is appropriate. In 
that case, we should expect the generalizable preference—in this 
case, for limitations on due care liability—to result in massive opting 
out of the duty.    
 Contrary to this view, some scholars instead see the massive opt-
ing out observed in Delaware firms since the adoption of section 
102(b)(7) as evidence that (a) directors see exculpation as significant-
ly redistributive and (b) rationally apathetic shareholders systemati-
cally fail to check directorial opportunism.174 Expecting that private 
ordering would result in heterogeneous choices regarding due care 
liability,175 some scholars have concluded that there must be some 
failure in the amendment process.  
 But what if shareholders instead generally prefer a low degree of 
accountability for director negligence, at least when that accountabil-
ity comes in the form of shareholder litigation?176 In fact, as discussed 
                                                                                                                    
 169. See Bebchuk, supra note 153, at 1850. 
 170. See id. (citing the fiduciary duty that prohibits self-dealing as an example  
of generalizability). 
 171. Bebchuk himself notes this point in a later article. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting 
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1787 (2006). 
 172. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 145, at 56-58 (offering reasons to doubt courts’ 
ability to arrive at a proper rule regarding corporate governance). 
 173. See Macey, supra note 148, at 209-11 (“[R]ational shareholders will often conclude 
that the savings associated with ‘opting-out’ of this costly litigation process greatly exceed 
the costs of denying themselves the rights afforded by the system.”). 
 174. See Brown & Gopalan, supra note 156, at 312-15.  
 175. Id. at 288 (“Shareholders wanting a high degree of accountability would presuma-
bly not support a waiver of damages. In other instances, shareholders might favor them in 
order to attract or retain qualified managers. Still other shareholders would presumably 
want a mix, allowing  waivers but only in specified circumstances.”). 
 176. Brown and Gopalan note the possibility that exculpation might be always prefer-
able, but they ultimately dismiss it. See id. at 306 n.116. The dismissal is effected by plac-
ing the burden of proof on exculpation proponents to show increased efficiency resulting 
from the adoption of section 102(b)(7) clauses. See id.
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above, there is at least some reason to believe that uniform adoption 
of exculpation clauses reflects not a promanagement bias, but a 
judgment against due care derivative suits as a disciplining mechan-
ism. Given the availability of relatively complete directors’ insurance 
for due care breaches, exculpation is likely to maximize shareholder 
wealth.177 Moreover, those constituencies that have the incentive and 
ability to influence shareholder votes have largely left due care ex-
culpation clauses alone.178 In short, there appears to be little reason 
to distrust the charter amendment mechanism’s ability to effectuate 
private ordering in regard to due care exculpation. 
 A final concern about the presumed efficiency of opting out relates 
to the potential for network and learning externalities.179 Learning 
externalities are created when firms discount novel rules because of 
their novelty.180 Novel rules are less valuable because they bring with 
them a sparser body of interpretation. Because certainty has inde-
pendent value, novel rules are likely to be discounted relative to well-
established rules, even though the novel rules might otherwise be 
preferable.181 If the discount is high enough, firms might opt for the 
otherwise less-preferred rules. 
 Network externalities are, to a large extent, predicted learning ex-
ternalities.182 Adopting a minority position in respect of any rule 
means that there will be fewer judicial or regulatory interpretations 
of the rule going forward. Lawyers will be less familiar with the rule 
and their advice will be less effective for it. Again, if the discount for 
this predicted uncertainty is high enough, minority positions may  
be under-adopted. 
 Firms that opted out of due care liability may have done so, in 
part, based on network and learning externalities. If the Van Gorkom
rule was novel, it brought with it few interpretations and, conse-
quently, little certainty (learning externalities). Moreover, each firm 
may have expected that other firms, perhaps many other firms, 
would opt out of Van Gorkom, and because of this predicted massive 
opting out, the value of Van Gorkom-style due care would be relative-
                                                                                                                    
 177. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 178. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
 179. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 733-36 
(1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA.
L. REV. 757, 792-808 (1995). 
 180. See Klausner, supra note 179, at 786-89. 
 181. Id. at 789. 
 182. See Kamar, supra note 41, at 1924 (“[Learning externalities] are nonetheless re-
lated to network externalities, in that a product widely used in the past is often still widely 
used in the present.”); Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 794 (2006) (“[I]nterpretive network externalities [are] 
basically future learning externalities.”). 
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ly low due to rarer future interpretations (network externalities). 
Consequently, firms that might have preferred Van Gorkom-style 
liability if guaranteed a high level of interpretation might nonethe-
less have chosen to exculpate. 
 It is hard to answer network or learning externality arguments in 
an entirely convincing fashion because it is hard to know exactly 
what discount one should assume is placed on novel rules. If the dis-
count is low, concerns over learning and network externalities largely 
disappear unless one assumes only a marginal preference for excul-
pation. Given the massive preference for opting out by firms, that as-
sumption is not persuasive. A high discount would be more explana-
tory and hence more troubling. As an initial matter, there was and 
would continue to be at least one data point regarding due care liabil-
ity—Van Gorkom itself. Nevertheless, one opinion does not defeat the 
problem posed by learning externalities and, assuming subsequent 
opting out by most other firms, does not defeat the problem posed by 
network externalities.  
 How high should we expect the discount for learning and network 
externalities to be? At least one commentator has observed that the 
learning and network externality arguments “seem[] to exaggerate 
the demand for uniformity.”183 Surely this is not an entirely persua-
sive case for assuming a low discount rate. But, considering the rea-
sons described above for thinking that due care exculpation is gener-
ally preferable, it is at least plausible that any discount would be less 
than the general preference for due care exculpation.184
C.   Caring About Conscious Disregard  
 If due care exculpation is such a wonderful thing, and it was 
threatened by the new conscious disregard standard and its nebulous 
application in due care cases, why not explicitly or implicitly elimi-
nate the new good faith doctrine? The answer is that while firms’ de-
cisions to exculpate directors for due care liability are worthy of pro-
tection, so too, at least initially, is the distinction between negligence 
or gross negligence and conscious action.  
                                                                                                                    
 183. See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6 
(2006); see also Kahan & Klausner, supra note 179, at 750-51 (“Moreover, as we consider 
only one major provision [in corporate bond risk covenants] to be substantially suboptimal, 
we consider the evidence that learning and network externalities led to suboptimal stan-
dardization in these covenants to be weak.”). But see Klausner, supra note 182, at 793 
(“Especially with respect to open-ended terms, such as those that address many fiduciary 
issues, learning externalities can be significant.”). 
 184. Indeed, Klausner, the most significant proponent of taking network externalities 
seriously, ultimately concludes that corporate codes should offer firms a menu of defined 
options from which to choose so as to mitigate the costs imposed by network externalities. 
See Klausner, supra note 179, at 837-40. Among the options Klausner notes are already on 
the menu is the option to exculpate for due care liability. See id. at 841 n.253. 
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 Throughout the law, conscious actions are treated differently than 
the unknowing kind. In the criminal law, the Model Penal Code dis-
tinguishes criminal negligence from recklessness, defined as a “con-
scious disregard” for particular risks.185 Criminal law scholars have of-
ten distinguished, for culpability purposes, actions taken with and 
without consciousness of attendant risks.186 Similarly, tort law imposes 
liability for recklessness at times when it does not for negligence.187
 Admittedly, courts in corporate law decisions have blurred this 
line, equating recklessness and conscious disregard with gross negli-
gence.188 Nevertheless, when structuring the relationship between 
managers and shareholders, either party might want to establish a 
system of fiduciary duties that deals with the reckless sort of manag-
er more harshly than the simply or even grossly negligent sort. From 
the shareholder’s standpoint, a director’s negligence or even gross 
negligence (the nonreckless sort) may give rise to a question as to 
whether the director is the right person for the job. Conscious disre-
gard, however, is liable to give the shareholder the impression that 
the director is personally attacking the shareholder or, at the very 
least, the values underlying the fiduciary duties themselves.189
 Some shareholders might not care whether a director was merely 
grossly negligent or was consciously so because in either case their 
interest as shareholders incurred damage.190 Whether differentiating 
between conscious behavior and unconscious behavior is a good idea 
in corporate law will be an intensely empirical question, the answer 
to which is beyond the scope of this Article. But given the differentia-
tion of culpability levels in other areas of the law, there should be a 
presumption that such differentiation could be useful in this area. To 
be clear, the costs of establishing a conscious disregard standard with 
teeth might ultimately outweigh that presumption. But, to the extent 
that we could reduce the cost or have some empirical ground to be-
                                                                                                                    
 185. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1980). 
 186. See, e.g., JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 136 (2d ed. 2005) 
(“The thesis that inadvertent damage reflects a moral fault is difficult to accept.”); Larry Alex-
ander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Acts of Risk Creation, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 375, 
378 (2008) (describing the similarities between purpose, knowledge, and recklessness and diffe-
rentiating them from negligence, which is not culpable); Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: 
A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 949-53 (2000). 
 187. See e.g., Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, The Wreckage of Recklessness, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 111, 115-16 (2008) (noting instances of the distinction). 
 188. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 189. See, e.g., Hall supra note 186, at 140 (“Voluntarily doing what is proscribed as a serious 
harm in a rational penal code challenges the communities sound values.”) (emphasis added). 
 190. Similarly, some shareholders might feel appreciably more aggrieved when a direc-
tor acts with the intent to do the shareholder harm. In both cases, a conscious disregard 
standard will not necessarily capture the shareholder’s entire point of view. 
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lieve the calculus was different, conscious disregard would be worth 
saving as a standard of review.191   
IV.   POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
 The arguments for allowing due care exculpation described in Part 
II.B lead to the conclusion that if the promise of due care exculpation 
is to be realized, it will be largely contingent on the ability of legal 
professionals to predict which types of claims will be exculpable in 
any given instance. For insurance premiums to be reduced by an 
amount allocable to the exculpated risk, the insurer must be confi-
dent that certain risks truly are exculpated. To prevent the distrac-
tions attendant to shareholder litigation and reduce the incentives to 
settle nuisance suits, there must be a method for disposing of due 
care cases quickly. If it is impossible to distinguish whether a set of 
derivative claims is exculpable or nonexculpable, the promise of an 
exculpatory clause is compromised. Thus, the variation in the Chan-
cery Court decisions described in Part I.C is troublesome.  
 More than clarity is required, however. The test for distinguishing 
gross negligence from conscious gross negligence should also avoid 
overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness. If overinclusive, such that 
simple due care claims are automatically treated as good faith 
claims, due care exculpation would be less useful. If underinclusive, 
such that actions demonstrating different levels of culpability are 
treated similarly, the promise of a conscious disregard standard 
would be lost.  
A.   Line-Drawing Attempts and the Lyondell Supreme Court Opinion 
 Since the conscious disregard standard was born, courts and scho-
lars have attempted to draw the line between exculpable gross negli-
gence and nonexculpable conscious gross negligence. After taking an 
interlocutory appeal of the Chancery Court’s decision in Lyondell, the 
Delaware Supreme Court adopted an approach that significantly nar-
rowed the standard’s applicability. The court’s decision provides the fi-
nal word for now on conscious disregard. Nevertheless, insofar as this 
Article advocates the road not taken by Delaware, it is instructive to 
examine a number of candidates proffered by commentators and 
judges for evaluating conscious disregard claims. Like the Supreme 
Court’s Lyondell decision, none of these other approaches could be 
said, with any degree of certainty, to strike the appropriate balance. 
                                                                                                                    
 191. This Article advocates permitting exculpation of conscious disregard claims. Along 
these lines, if transaction costs are low and externalities are not an issue, an expansion of 
the menu of choices will almost always be good for shareholders, no matter the basis on 
which the new option is added.   
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 Before proceeding to the serious possibilities, it is necessary to dis-
pose of a less serious one. Plaintiffs could be required to show actual,
rather than inferred, consciousness on the part of directors that their 
duties required a certain course of action and that their actions failed 
to meet that threshold. Such a requirement would effectively eliminate 
liability for conscious disregard claims. Even in a world filled with 
rampant conscious disregard, direct evidence of such behavior is ex-
tremely hard to find. In an unpublished opinion written years before 
he wrote his opinion in Caremark, Chancellor Allen noted this difficul-
ty and held that an inquiry into a director’s improper motive (and 
therefore bad faith) “necessarily will require inferences to be drawn 
from overt conduct—the quality of the decision made being one notable 
possible source of such an inference.”192 Subjective states of mind—
including conscious disregard—are simply too hard for plaintiffs to 
prove (or even allege with sufficient specificity) if they are unable to 
draw inferences from more readily observed conduct. One might as 
well get rid of the conscious disregard standard. Along this line, even 
the staunchest critics of the new conscious disregard standard do not 
advocate requiring direct evidence of knowledge. 
1.   Super Gross Negligence 
 If direct evidence of knowledge is too tough a burden, what infe-
rence-based standard should be used to determine “consciousness?” 
Chancellor Allen nodded in the direction of such a standard in Ci-
tron. Citron was a sale-of-the-company case in which the defining is-
sue was whether the board’s decision to accept one bid rather than 
another was inexplicable on any ground other than “an otherwise 
unproven inappropriate motive—such as personal favoritism or an-
tipathy.”193 To infer such a motive, Chancellor Allen required some 
unspecified—but clearly unsatisfied—level of either deviation from 
                                                                                                                    
 192. Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., No. 6085, 1988 WL 53322, at *15 
(Del. Ch. May 19, 1988) (emphasis added); see also Lyman P. Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1203 (2004) 
(“The court, in assessing director behavior, is not substantively evaluating conduct, but is 
drawing an inference about the propriety of director motive from the nature of the conduct. 
This allows the court an indirect way to do what the business judgment rule precludes—
consider the substance of director conduct; not to assess it outright, but to draw an inference 
of bad motive if it is sufficiently egregious.”); Reed & Neiderman, supra note 26, at 123-24 (“It 
is the magnitude or ongoing nature of the action(s) or inaction(s) that provides the indicia of 
what ultimately needs to be proven—i.e., the director’s good faith or bad faith motivation 
(‘state of mind’). . . . What this has to mean is that if such a determination is made, the court 
has concluded that if the facts as pleaded are true, the directors had to have known (i.e., had 
the requisite culpable ‘state of mind’) that they were violating their fiduciary duties or had an 
ill motive.”). But see Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 754 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“It is unclear, based upon 
existing jurisprudence, whether motive is a necessary element for a successful claim that a 
director has acted in bad faith, and, if so, whether that motive must be shown explicitly or 
whether it can be inferred from the directors’ conduct.”). 
 193. 1988 WL 53322, at *16. 
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the “bounds of reasonable judgment,” “egregious[ness]” or “irration-
al[ity].”194 Announcing a new “super-gross negligence” (or “unreason-
ableness”, “egregiousness” or “irrationality”) standard,195 however, 
did not necessarily define it. Obviously, there are bound to be prob-
lems distinguishing exculpable gross negligence from nonexculpable 
super-gross negligence. 
 Hillary Sale, while advocating for an “egregiousness” test for the 
duty of good faith, recognized this very point: 
Good faith based liability, then, moves the bar from negligent beha-
vior to deliberately indifferent, egregious, subversive, or knowing 
behavior, and thereby raises issues related to the motives of the ac-
tors. Of course, the key question is how to define “egregious.” With-
out an appropriate line between the grossly negligent duty of care 
violations and those that are more deliberate and egregious, good 
faith will not serve as a meaningful separate duty, and it will raise 
the same concerns as those that followed Smith v. Van Gorkom.196
To Sale, the answer was to analogize good faith to securities fraud, 
moving to a scienter-based standard where something like “reckless-
ness” suffices.197 According to Sale, securities law does a reasonably 
good job at distinguishing grossly negligent misrepresentations from 
reckless or egregious ones.198 By implication, Delaware law should 
have little trouble doing so outside of the securities law context.  
 It is not clear, however, that securities opinions have drawn the 
line so well.199 The definition of recklessness that Sale approvingly 
quotes—“a highly unreasonable [act or] omission, involving not mere-
ly simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure 
from the standards of ordinary care . . . which presents a danger . . . 
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor 
must have been aware of it”200—acknowledges a difference between 
                                                                                                                    
 194. Id. at *16 n.18. 
 195. The term was coined by Christopher Bruner. See Bruner, supra note 18, at 1181. 
 196. Sale, supra note 51, at 488-89. 
 197. Sale was writing in the aftermath of the Disney III language (upon which Stone
built), whose “deliberate indifference” language sent a reasonably clear message that 
something like “recklessness” would violate the duty of good faith.  
 198. See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the 
Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 WASH.
U. L. Q. 537, 545-52 (1998). Although the referenced sections provide examples of courts 
drawing lines between recklessness and nonrecklessness, those examples do not offer clear 
guidance regarding the way in which allegations of recklessness must go beyond gross neg-
ligence. If the two concepts are at all coextensive or difficult to distinguish, then good faith 
liability would be at odds with due care exculpation clauses. 
 199. Christopher Bruner has asked this very question in response to Sale’s proposal. 
See Bruner, supra note 18, at 1180-82.  
 200. Sale, supra note 51, at 490 n.266 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 
428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)). 
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recklessness and “inexcusable” negligence, but fails to explain what 
the difference is or ought to be.201
 Moreover, Delaware law has had its own troubles distinguishing 
between directors’ gross negligence and their recklessness.202 In fact, 
Delaware courts have, at times, explicitly equated the two con-
cepts.203 Authorities as eminent as former Chancellor Allen, Justice 
Jacobs, and Vice Chancellor Strine have stated that “[t]o implement 
th[e] rationality concept [underlying the business judgment rule 
standard of review], Delaware corporate cases have adopted a gross 
negligence standard that requires a plaintiff to demonstrate a degree 
of culpability on the part of the directors that is akin to the reckless-
ness standard employed in other contexts.”204 If “gross negligence” 
equals “irrationality,” which equals “recklessness,” it seems that De-
laware courts would have to start from scratch and create some 
heightened form of recklessness to distinguish good faith claims from 
due care claims.205
                                                                                                                    
 201. Sale explicitly acknowledges this: “Of course, like their Delaware counterparts, 
these federal securities cases do not provide a single bright line rule that distinguishes 
scienter from other states of mind.” Id. at 491. In a different piece, Sale is less sanguine 
about the ability of federal district courts to develop nuanced tests for determining scienter 
in securities fraud cases. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. R. 903, 
944 (2002) (noting the post-PSLRA proliferation of “bright-line rules” regarding scienter al-
legations and their generally prodefendant bent). 
 202. Here “recklessness” includes any type of “consciousness” or “motive” standard for 
which circumstantial proof of the relevant actors’ behavior may be used. 
 203. See Matthew R. Berry, Note, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless 
Directors from Personal Liability? Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L.
REV. 1125, 1135-37 (2004) (“In the corporate context, gross negligence means ‘reckless in-
difference to or a deliberate disregard of the whole body of stockholders . . . .’ ” (quoting 
Tomczak v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 1990 WL 42607, at *12 (Del. Ch. 1990))); see also Drury, 
supra note 132, at 136-37 (“While overlap between gross negligence and good faith is poss-
ible, the two concepts should not coincide entirely . . . . While one could argue that there 
are fine points of distinction between the two definitions above, there is a long way to go in 
separating good faith from gross negligence.”). 
 204. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of 
Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and 
its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 453 (2002). 
 205. Sale cites a post-PSLRA case in which that approach seems to have been taken. 
See Sale, supra note 198, at 571 (citing In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation, 
970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997) as requiring “deliberate recklessness”).  
 Andrew Gold recognizes the difficulty in establishing a standard of review that re-
quires more than the kind of irrationality or recklessness that serves as the test for gross 
negligence. See Gold, supra note 50, at 431 (noting that a collapsing of care and good faith 
standards of review is likely inevitable and, in any event, justified by the unsettled nature 
of the due care standard of review). If gross negligence has been established as the stan-
dard of review for care claims since adoption of section 102(b)(7), then there is less need to 
distinguish due care from good faith for purposes of effectuating legislative intent. On this 
account, section 102(b)(7) allowed firms to opt out of something like an ordinary negligence 
standard of review (the kind apparently used in Van Gorkom) and was not intended to say 
anything about gross negligence, recklessness, or irrationality. Thus, it is not inconsistent 
with section 102(b)(7) for courts to adopt a gross negligence, recklessness, or irrationality 
standard for nonexculpable good faith claims. See id. at 447-48 (“[C]ourts should apply a 
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 Along this line, and as discussed in Part I.C, the court in McPad-
den explicitly disavowed a recklessness standard for good faith 
claims, dividing the world between exculpable “reckless indifference 
or actions that are without the bounds of reason” and nonexculpable 
conscious disregard.206 While it confirmed the view that a reckless-
ness standard is apt to bleed into traditional due care analysis (in-
deed, it often is the traditional due care analysis), the McPadden de-
cision fails to explain what would be needed to move a claim beyond 
recklessness and into conscious disregard.207 This is hardly the fault 
of Chancellor Chandler. Conscious disregard is recklessness in other 
areas of the law.208 Moreover, gross negligence, conscious disregard, 
recklessness, and egregiousness are famously vague terms. Unless 
concretized by reference to something else, there will always be the 
potential for slippage.  
 The next few Subsections take stock of some of the more promi-
nent ways of tying conscious disregard to tests that are ostensibly 
less susceptible to such vagueness.  
2.   “Plus” Factors 
 One potential answer, given the apparent impossibility of truly 
distinguishing gross negligence from any sort of conscious or super-
gross negligence as such, is to live with a gross negligence standard 
but simultaneously require additional “plus” factors to move into the 
realm of conscious disregard. To be successful, the “plus-factors” ap-
proach would have to meet the three criteria described earlier: clari-
ty, non-overinclusiveness, and non-underinclusiveness. 
 Sean Griffith has described Delaware courts’ approach to good 
faith cases as taking something akin to a plus-factor approach. Ac-
                                                                                                                    
rational basis test when confronting allegations of bad faith conduct.”). While true, it may 
still be that exculpation even for gross negligence, recklessness, or irrationality might be 
advantageous, for the reasons described supra Part II.B. 
 206. McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1274 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
 207. Ryan is also of little help in this regard. This is primarily due to the court’s treat-
ment of due care and good faith as practically identical issues. Secondarily, however, the 
problem with using Ryan to separate due care from good faith is likely that the board did 
not even violate its duty of care. There seems to be significant evidence that the Lyondell 
board satisfied Revlon via Barkan’s exception for well-informed boards. This is not to say 
that Revlon had no application to the deal because Revlon duties were not activated until 
the decision to sell was made. Clearly, the board had no obligation, upon the filing of the 
13D, to shop the company. Nevertheless, Revlon duties would be shrunk beyond recogni-
tion if they had no application in the situation where (1) a credible buyer announced its in-
tention to purchase a target, (2) the target board did nothing, and (3) that board was later 
unable to do a market check because of a subsequently mandated short deal phase. The 
better reading of the applicable Revlon duties is that Revlon did not apply upon the filing 
of the 13D except that the board would thereafter be open to a Revlon claim if it ultimately 
decided to sell to that bidder and its later attempts to satisfy Revlon were thwarted by, for 
instance, the bidder’s aggressive timetable.  
 208. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
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cordingly, Disney could be understood as a gross negligence case with 
a plus factor of any or all of (1) the friendship between Michael Eisn-
er and Michael Ovitz,209 (2) the imperial nature of Eisner’s tenure at 
the company, and (3) the nature of the issues at stake (executive 
compensation).210 Similarly, Vice Chancellor Noble’s decision in El-
kins211 could be seen as an executive compensation plus-factor case.212
Notably, at least Griffith’s plus- factor argument is entirely posi-
tive—it is an attempt to explain why the courts did what they did—
and therefore makes no claim on being the most desirable solution.  
 Because the claim was a positive one, Griffith did not need to an-
nounce a field theory describing all appropriate plus factors. An at-
tempt at such a theory was persuasively offered, however, by Claire 
Hill and Brett McDonnell.213 They argue, from a distinctly normative 
perspective, that plaintiffs should be able to show a violation of good 
faith by demonstrating gross negligence coupled with a plus factor, 
namely an environment of structural bias.214 On their account, struc-
tural bias arises from any one of three conditions: shared group mem-
bership between executives and the board, particularly collegial rela-
tionships between such groups, and the adoption of a “pernicious golden 
rule” which encourages boards to treat other directors and executives 
as they themselves would like to be treated.215 Examples of the types of 
decisions around which structural bias might exist are numerous, and 
                                                                                                                    
 209. See Griffith, supra note 35, at 20-21 (noting the Disney III opinion’s constant ref-
erence to Ovitz and Eisner’s friendship). 
 210. In fact, Chancellor Chandler’s Disney IV opinion seemingly required a deadly sin 
(though excluding sloth of a magnitude less than systematic or sustained shirking). See
907 A.2d 693, 754 (Del. Ch. 2005).  
 211. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, 
No. Civ.A. 20228, 2004 WL 1949290 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004). 
 212. Griffith makes clear his view of the implications of the compensation context:  
Why is executive compensation different? Why is board deference appropriate 
in other matters but not here? The answer, obviously, is that management has 
an overwhelming interest in setting its own compensation as high as it possibly 
can and cannot be trusted to act in the best interests of the corporation. Be-
cause of this conflict of interest, the board cannot simply defer to management’s 
judgment . . . .  
Executive compensation, in other words, is a special case in which manage-
ment’s loyalty cannot be assumed. If the board does not exercise its own judg-
ment to constrain management, there is no way to be confident that the result-
ing decision is not the product of self-interest. Here again, in other words, there 
is a duty-of-loyalty concern. Executive compensation is a special case for scru-
tiny of the board’s “good faith”—that is, a situation in which the process re-
quirements of the duty of care will be especially scrutinized for what is, at its 
core, a duty-of-loyalty problem. 
Griffith, supra note 35, at 26. 
 213. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 167. 
 214. Id. at 855-56. 
 215. Id. at 839. 
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Hill and McDonnell point to a handful: executive compensation, disin-
terested directors’ approval of interested transactions, business combi-
nations, shareholder demand, and pet charity donations.216
 The most promising aspect of the structural bias plus-factor ap-
proach is that it covers a lot of the ground that good faith purports to 
cover. Taking away all cases of structural bias, it would likely be an 
anomalous director who consciously disregarded his or her duties. 
Excluded from a structural bias analysis’ reach would be only the 
truly malignant or slothful director and, even then, the excluded be-
havior would be limited to a much smaller world of corporate actions. 
For example, each McPadden, Lyondell, and In re Lear would seem to 
satisfy Hill and McDonnell’s structural bias factor insofar as they are 
either takeover cases (Lyondell and In re Lear) or executive enrich-
ment cases (McPadden).
 Unfortunately, a situation’s potential for structural bias, the key 
factor for Hill and McDonnell’s proposal, may be hard to ascertain.217
Furthermore, just because some structural bias may exist, this does 
not necessarily mean that due care exculpation and the business 
judgment rule should be thrown overboard. Thus, even if it were poss-
ible to consistently determine whether the potential for structural bias 
existed, courts would still need to evaluate the relative strength of that 
potential. Along these lines, Hill and McDonnell advocate a sliding 
scale approach: “The stronger the structural bias, the weaker the 
showing of gross negligence would need to be.”218 Obviously this counts 
against the approach’s clarity score. Nevertheless, while not perfectly 
well-defined, recourse to structural bias might provide a more definite 
condition precedent than some sort of heightened level of gross negli-
gence for limiting due care exculpation. For example, courts could de-
velop a rule of thumb that assigns a certain presumption of structural 
bias to often-occurring situations.  In sum, structural bias as a plus 
factor could avoid vagueness and underinclusiveness.  
 The remaining question is whether a structural-bias-plus-gross-
negligence test might capture too many cases that ought to be judged 
under the business judgment rule and subject to due care exculpation. 
There is reason to think that it would. Hill and McDonnell note that 
structural bias would be found whenever there are significant ties be-
tween directors and officers and a sense that the directors deferred to 
the officers’ wishes.219 Of course, this arguably describes the vast ma-
jority of decisions that boards make or at least the vast majority of 
                                                                                                                    
 216. Id. at 858. 
 217. Hill and McDonnell admit as much: “Of course, [structural bias] determinations 
are very fact-sensitive. Indeed courts have had enormous difficulty judging when someone 
is improperly beholden.” Id. at 853. 
 218. Id. at 856. 
 219. Id. at 861. 
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shareholder complaint characterizations that courts are likely to see. 
Hill and McDonnell would then require gross negligence or, alterna-
tively, “egregiously bad or non-existent procedure,”220 a test that would 
seem to swallow up due care.221 While a persuasive approach to consi-
dering the range of a fiduciary’s conduct, a structural-bias-plus-gross-
negligence test is likely to undervalue due care exculpation.222
 The overinclusiveness of Hill and McDonnell’s approach is not 
surprising. A well-defined condition to good faith liability, while po-
tentially solving vagueness concerns, is almost certain to be either 
overinclusive or underinclusive. For example, the other end of the 
spectrum is the “deadly sin” plus factor advocated by Chancellor 
Chandler in Disney IV.223  Because lust, greed, etc. do not comprise 
the totality of the situations in which a director might be said to have 
consciousness of his or her disregard, they will be underinclusive and 
leave the standard too weak.224 Some plus-factor approaches will be 
better than others, but as proxies for a director’s state of mind, they 
will necessarily be imperfect. 
3.   Inapplicability in Transactional Context 
 As described in Part I.C above, Vice Chancellor Strine has recom-
mended “chariness” with regard to finding conscious disregard in the 
transactional context. However, the failure to provide a standard for 
such chariness posed a significant problem for the new good faith. On 
that score, “chariness” in application is as vague as the “gross negli-
gence” or “egregiousness” standards themselves.  
 One could interpret the “chariness” language in In re Lear, however, 
as advocating, albeit modestly, a categorical exclusion of transaction-
based claims from conscious disregard liability. Under this reading, 
conscious disregard liability would be limited to something like Care-
mark failure-to-monitor legal compliance claims. The line-drawing 
problem would be solved in cases like Ryan or McPadden, and due care 
exculpation would be saved outside of the legal oversight context. 
 Two problems arise with this approach. First, before treating 
oversight claims differently than transactional due care claims, we 
should have a sensible basis for doing so. Vice Chancellor Strine’s ar-
gument for chariness in the transactional context seems equally ap-
plicable to the oversight context. In the oversight context too, “a 
board will always face the question of how much process should be 
                                                                                                                    
 220. Id.
 221. If the latter, the proposed test would be subject to the same criticism described in 
Part III.A.3 infra.
 222. See Gold, supra note 50, at 468-69 (arguing against Hill and McDonnell’s approach). 
 223. See supra note 210. 
 224. See Gold, supra note 50, at 431 n.228 (“A requirement of irrational conduct plus an im-
proper motive . . . might limit enforcement of the duty of good faith to the point of irrelevancy.”). 
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devoted to that [decision] given its overall importance in light of the 
myriad of other decisions the board must make.”225 While oversight 
does not entail “seizing specific opportunities” in a condensed time 
period or the benefits of timely decisionmaking,226 oversight does car-
ry costs. Those costs are likely to be undervalued in hindsight if and 
when an oversight claim is made. 
 Second, even if oversight claims are qualitatively different enough 
to justify different treatment, it does not follow that Delaware must 
discard conscious disregard in the transactional context. Doctrinally, 
the Delaware courts would have to distinguish Disney, which was 
based on a transaction-specific claim. At the most fundamental level, 
though, courts would be in the position of unilaterally determining 
that the costs of imposing conscious disregard liability on directors 
were greater than the benefits generated by retaining that standard 
in transactional cases. Evidence could be produced that might dem-
onstrate this, but it has not been to this point.   
4.   Complete Absence of Process and Justice Berger’s Lyondell
Opinion 
 As mentioned above, Vice Chancellor Noble addressed the defini-
tion of conscious disregard in Elkins. Ruling after Disney II but be-
fore the later Disney iterations and Stone, he wrote that conscious 
disregard could be shown by irrationality of process, which in turn 
could be shown by demonstrating that a board did not “engage[] in 
any form of review or deliberation.”227 For purposes of showing con-
scious disregard of duties, the opinion placed ultimate weight on the 
distinction between allegations of nondeliberation and allegations of 
“not enough deliberation.”228 The advantage of such a standard is ob-
vious. While “gross negligence” and “conscious disregard” are likely to 
be susceptible to inconsistent application, courts could objectively 
and fairly easily apply a “some deliberation” requirement. 
 But that conclusion merely serves to highlight the question of how 
serious courts should be about denying conscious disregard claims if 
the board engaged in “any” deliberation. In Elkins, for instance, there 
was a claim centering on a compensation committee’s approval of fa-
vorable modifications to company loans made to the company’s CEO 
and chairman.229 In not dismissing the good faith claim regarding 
                                                                                                                    
 225. See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 654 (Del. Ch.2008). 
 226. Id.
 227. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Serv., Inc. v. Elkins, No. 
CIV.A.20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *22, n.92 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004) (emphasis added). 
 228. Id. at *16 n.58; see also Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Di-
rector Conduct: Are Delaware Courts Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket 
After Disney?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531, 566-68 (2005) (summarizing the Elkins opinion). 
 229. See Elkins, 2004 WL 1949290, at *1. 
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those modifications, the opinion characterized the complaint as alleg-
ing that although the compensation committee deliberated over the 
matter, it did not consult with any experts and did not consider its 
costs or benefits to the company.230 Thus, even while announcing a 
no-deliberation standard, the Elkins opinion seemed to condition the 
decision on the quality of deliberation. 
 That result is likely a sensible one. A strict nondeliberation test 
renders the conscious disregard standard irrelevant in most cases 
where one might actually find a director consciously disregarding his 
or her duties.231 A complete absence of deliberation on the part of the 
board—required to prevent the test from becoming one of poor delibe-
ration or gross negligence—would mean that a board’s cursory ap-
proval of various matters would pass muster even if the circums-
tances otherwise indicated that the board likely knew that it was 
breaching its duty of care. Such a test, while responsive to concerns 
about the importance of distinguishing good faith from due care, re-
legates conscious disregard to a nonexistent role in Delaware law. 
 Yet this is the approach that the Supreme Court ultimately 
adopted.232 In her opinion for a unanimous en banc court hearing the 
appeal in Lyondell, Justice Berger observed that the proper inquiry 
for a conscious disregard claim is “whether th[e] directors utterly
failed to attempt to,”233 in that case, satisfy their Revlon duties. Be-
cause the Lyondell board did something to obtain the best sales price, 
plaintiffs’ conscious disregard claim failed.  
 Adopting an “utter failure” standard was a radical step to take. As 
discussed above, there are undoubtedly processes short of utter fail-
ures that might still evince conscious disregard of duties by direc-
tors.234 The test announced in Lyondell fails to capture a range of be-
                                                                                                                    
 230. See id. at *20. 
 231. A strict nondeliberation test is subject to criticism on the entirely opposite ground 
that requiring some board deliberation is an inappropriate incursion on board authority. 
See Griffith, supra note 35, at 26 (“One might ask, however, whether the decision not to de-
liberate at all, like the decision to deliberate for ten minutes or twenty, is not also a busi-
ness decision, insulated from judicial second guessing by the business judgment rule.”); see 
also Bainbridge et al., supra note 7, at 600-03. 
 232. The Court also nodded to Vice Chancellor Strine’s distinction between transac-
tional and nontransactional cases, though that point was not the main thrust of the opi-
nion. See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (quoting In re Lear).
 233. Id. at 244 (emphasis added). Earlier in the same paragraph, the standard was en-
capsulated as a “knowing[] and complete[]” failure to undertake their responsibilities. Id.
at 243-44 (emphasis added). The conjunctive nature of this construction is puzzling. Pre-
sumably, proof that the directors knowingly failed to undertake their responsibilities 
would suffice to demonstrate conscious disregard, even without a showing of a “complete” 
failure. The “complete failure” qualifier only makes sense as a standard for determining 
the difficult-to-capture knowledge requirement, not as a separate condition to liability.  
 234. The extreme nature of the Lyondell opinion is only heightened by the fact that the 
court could have easily found for the directors without adopting such a test. The court had 
already ruled that Revlon duties did not apply until the two weeks prior to the parties’ 
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havior for which liability may be preferable, even assuming that due 
care failures are to be otherwise exculpated. Given the empirical na-
ture of the question, one cannot say for certain that liability in “terri-
ble but not utter” failure cases would be a good idea. Along the same 
line, however, the court could not say for certain that imposing such 
liability would or could not be a good idea. Indeed, the Lyondell opi-
nion fails to even acknowledge the arguments to be made on either 
side, preferring to imply that the “utter failure” test was the obvious 
and natural result of the new good faith. 
B.   Allowing Shareholders to Opt Out of the Conscious Disregard 
Standard 
 Delaware had an established method for dealing with such uncer-
tainty surrounding the benefits and costs of a new standard of review: 
permissible exculpation Allowing for good faith exculpation would 
have required an amendment to section 102(b)(7) whereby the good 
faith exclusion in the statute would, itself, have an exclusion for claims 
of conscious disregard. Under this regime, corporations could have 
chosen to opt out of director liability for both due care and conscious 
disregard claims, or they could have continued to exculpate only due 
care claims.235 Firms that placed a high value on the benefits of due 
care exculpation and/or a low value on the benefits of a new culpability 
distinction could have exculpated conscious disregard liability, while 
others who highly prized a “consciousness” standard236 could have cho-
sen not to exculpate. If we observed significant or minimal opting out, 
that would have gone part of the way toward an empirical evaluation 
of the merits of a robust conscious disregard standard. 
 The Lyondell decision changes things, as conscious disregard ap-
pears to be off the table as a meaningful standard for Delaware 
courts.237 But if a more vibrant duty, coupled with the possibility for 
exculpation, would be preferable, nothing should prevent the Dela-
ware Supreme Court from revisiting the draconian rule of Lyondell if 
the legislature amended section 102(b)(7) to permit exculpation. On 
                                                                                                                    
agreement. See id. at 242. The focus of the plaintiffs’ complaint was the board’s inaction 
during the period before those two weeks. Once that inaction was off the table, so to speak, 
the complaint would have failed under any interpretation of conscious disregard. 
 235. Of course, corporations would remain free to choose not to exculpate directors  
for anything. 
 236. This regime could look something like Sale’s egregiousness standard, see supra
notes 197-199 and accompanying text, Hill and McDonnell’s structural-bias-plus-gross-
negligence standard, see supra notes 214-219 and accompanying text, or something else, as 
long as it was not underinclusive and exculpation was available. 
 237. There is always the possibility that Delaware could qualify the extreme position of 
Lyondell. See infra notes 241-43 (discussing the political economy of “good faith”). Never-
theless, “utter” and “complete” are stark terms, unlike “good faith” or “negligence.” 
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the other hand, Lyondell is likely to reduce the pressure on the De-
laware legislature to act in the first place.  
 In any event, taking the approach described herein is subject to at 
least three significant objections: (1) the charter amendment process 
surrounding conscious disregard exculpation suffers from serious 
flaws that call into question the legitimacy of any exculpation deci-
sions; (2) conscious disregard exculpation goes too far and will prec-
lude liability in an important group of claims that would be captured 
even by an underinclusive version of conscious disregard; and (3) 
permitting exculpation will make federal preemption more likely. For 
reasons discussed below, none of these arguments is particularly per-
suasive, though the second comes the closest.  
1.   Within the Contractarian Model 
 As discussed in Part II.B, due care exculpation is likely to be op-
timal across firms given the state of D&O insurance. Moreover, good 
contractarians should, assuming either a fair amount of interfirm dif-
ference or the possibility of regulatory error, conclude that due care 
exculpation is efficient. The argument for allowing conscious disre-
gard exculpation follows similar lines. 
  Standard D&O insurance policies cover claims of conscious disre-
gard of duties, just as they cover due care claims.238 Because the en-
tire cost of conscious disregard insurance is ultimately borne by the 
shareholders and because insurance provides incentives for manag-
ers to settle even nonmeritorious claims (and therefore for entrepre-
neurial plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring such claims), conscious disregard 
exculpation is likely to be preferable as long as insurance coverage 
would be relatively complete, such that any liability rule would have 
little impact on directors’ incentives. 
 Even given less-than-complete insurance, permissible conscious 
disregard exculpation is not particularly susceptible to the market 
failures described with regard to other charter provisions. Consider 
exculpation at the initial charter stage. There is no reason to think 
                                                                                                                    
 238. See Black et al., supra note 127, at 1086 (“Taken together, the deliberate fraud 
and personal profit exclusions [in D&O insurance policies] are considerably narrower than 
the good faith limitation on indemnification since the exclusions contemplate some form of 
actual dishonesty, whereas the good faith standard will be breached if there has been a 
‘conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.’ ”). The continuation, post-Stone, of such cov-
erage supports Black’s famous conclusion that corporate law does not really matter insofar 
as there exists any number of extralegal mechanisms that corporate actors can utilize to 
achieve their preferred goal. See Black, supra note 148, at 567-68. In this case, despite le-
gal liability for conscious disregard of duties, directors may purchase insurance (costless to 
them) and thereby pass the liability on to third parties and ultimately shareholders, the 
purported beneficiaries of the liability rule. On this account, although corporate law may 
be relatively powerless to affect the behavior of directors, it does impose litigation costs on 
the corporation that would not exist but for the liability rule.  
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that information problems will arise in evaluating conscious disre-
gard exculpation. Allowing conscious disregard exculpation moves 
the range of outcomes from two—due care exculpation and no due 
care exculpation239— to three—due care exculpation, due care excul-
pation plus conscious disregard exculpation, and no exculpation at 
all. If investors and shareholders are able to determine whether or 
not to discount for or vote against due care exculpation clauses, it is 
hard to imagine that it will be particularly costly to add one alterna-
tive to the calculus, particularly when that variable is in the same 
charter provision in which due care exculpation is found.  
 Further, while the expansion of the range of liability regimes is 
bound to marginally increase the uncertainty for investors as to the 
operative liability regime, two factors should minimize any change. 
First, the difference in a firm’s value under a conscious disregard re-
gime, as opposed to the alternative, is likely to be small enough so 
that any valuation errors that investors make will be similarly small. 
Admittedly, this requires a potentially controversial assumption that 
conscious disregard does not characterize a significant proportion of 
director behavior. More importantly, because the conscious disregard 
standard is relatively young, investors have recently been forced to 
make an investment in understanding the difference between the 
pre-Disney/Stone world and post-Disney/Stone world. Any additional 
cost to investors will be incurred only after the impact of the con-
scious disregard standard has been priced, meaning that the addi-
tional cost will be limited to determining exculpation vel non and ap-
plying an already established discount factor.  
 As between the potential for gross negligence and conscious gross 
negligence, there is little if any appreciable difference in the informa-
tional asymmetries among managers and shareholders at the adop-
tion of an exculpation provision. It is, of course, possible that a board 
expects to consciously disregard its duties in the future in a way that 
it could, by definition, not expect to negligently act. And it may be 
able to successfully hide this expectation from shareholders. Never-
theless, because the personal gains from intentional disregard of the 
duty of care are likely to be incidental, one should expect such situa-
tions to arise infrequently.  
 As for midstream amendments, conscious disregard exculpation 
poses a relatively benign redistribution threat.240 In fact, the poten-
tial redistribution to directors in the form of saved time and energy is 
                                                                                                                    
 239. It need not be the case that the current section 102(b)(7) results in a binary 
choice. Corporations are free to tailor exculpation to cover certain due care claims and not 
others. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that firms rarely do so. See Brown & Gopalan, 
supra note 156, at 310-11. There is no reason to expect that conscious disregard exculpa-
tion would be any different. 
 240. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
2010]                         OPTING OUT OF GOOD FAITH 443 
likely to be identical to that in due care cases. Taking the conscious 
disregard liability rule as a given does create some potential for redi-
stribution (of monetary penalties) from shareholders to directors, but 
as with due care exculpation, the availability of reasonably complete 
insurance coverage largely eliminates any concern. The conscious 
disregard standard can likely be generalized across companies so 
that the need for contractual freedom is lessened. But as discussed in 
Part II.B, that is not a complete answer. The conscious disregard 
standard’s appropriateness is uncertain (or worse), meaning it is bet-
ter to allow corporations to opt out of the rule.  
 Finally, there may be externalities at play. A diverse set of rules 
will lead to fewer judicial decisions for any particular rule, thereby 
making all rules less predictable for directors seeking to structure 
their behavior.241 Limitations on the ability to opt out of any given 
rule produce a public good.242 Along similar lines, contracting parties 
may be biased in favor of choosing otherwise suboptimal rules be-
cause of network or learning externalities.243
 The public good, network, and learning externality arguments are 
not particularly persuasive in this context. Each argument presumes 
that fewer choices over rules will lead (or, in the case of learning ex-
ternalities, have led) to greater concentration of interpretive re-
sources on any given rule, which leads to more certainty about those 
rules. For the public good argument, this potential societal loss, to be 
borne by entities outside of any given firm, provides a reason to limit 
the contractual freedom of any particular parties. In this case, the 
point would be that we are apt to have a more certain, and therefore 
more valuable, standard for conscious disregard if every firm is sub-
ject to it.244   
 Public good arguments must also demonstrate that the uncertain-
ty imposed by the opting-out firm creates costs that outweigh the ag-
gregate benefits realized by the firms that opt out. That is, one must 
demonstrate that the opt-out choice would be suboptimal if the rule 
forced the firm to internalize the societal cost of marginally fewer 
judicial interpretations. However, the primary benefit of opting out of 
conscious disregard is avoidance of the uncertainty generated by the 
                                                                                                                    
 241. See Klausner, supra note 179, at 777-78. 
 242. For the canonical version of this account, see Gordon, supra note 148, at 1567-69. 
 243. See Klausner, supra note 179, at 789 (“[W]hen some degree of diversity would be 
socially optimal, the market may reach an equilibrium in which a single product, or too few 
products, dominate. . . . [W]hen two or more products with network externalities compete 
for dominance, the market may reach an equilibrium in which a single product is adopted, 
but it is the wrong one. Finally, if a product with network externalities has already been 
widely adopted, either the market may ‘lock into’ that product and lock out socially desira-
ble innovations, or it may too readily abandon the product.”). 
 244. Yet the analysis in Parts II.A and III.A above showed that a robust conscious dis-
regard standard is unlikely to be distinguishable from that of gross negligence. 
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otherwise mandatory rule from Disney and Stone (at least a robust 
version of it). Any public good argument against conscious disregard 
exculpation would have been similarly applicable to due care excul-
pation in 1986. Because of section 102(b)(7), there have undoubtedly 
been fewer decisions distinguishing negligence from gross negligence. 
It seems safe to say that the meaning of “gross negligence” is less 
clear today than it might have been but for due care exculpation. But 
that does not mean that the uncertainty generated by opting-out 
outweighs the certainty gained by opting out. This counterargument 
is strengthened, in the case of due care exculpation, by the fact that 
most firms opted out, thereby lessening the aggregate destabilizing 
effect imposed on firms that retained due care liability. 
 As to the question of learning and network externalities, the ana-
lyses roughly mirror those with respect to due care exculpation. If 
anything, there are marginally more historical cases interpreting 
conscious disregard at this point than there were enforcing the Van 
Gorkom-style duty of care in 1986. Going forward, it seems uncontro-
versial to predict that no more firms will opt out of conscious disre-
gard liability than opted out of due care liability. None of this is to 
say that network and learning externalities could not adversely affect 
the charter amendment process. It is merely to say that if they do, we 
ought to worry a great deal about due care exculpation as well. And if 
one is not prepared to call for the abolition of section 102(b)(7),245
then one should not oppose conscious disregard exculpation on the 
basis of learning or network externalities.246
2.   Other Concerns 
 There may be other concerns over allowing conscious disregard 
exculpation. This Part addresses two in particular: (1) the argument 
that exculpation would allow firms to throw the baby (limited but 
important cases of blatant conscious disregard) out with the bathwa-
ter (conscious disregard generally) and (2) the argument that excul-
pation will preclude Delaware from adjusting its liability standards 
as necessary to prevent federal preemption. While both complaints 
                                                                                                                    
 245. See supra note 184. 
 246. Andrew Gold suggests a different kind of potential problem with the robust stan-
dard opt-out approach: there might be too little opting out. If no board would bring an opt-
out provision to its shareholders for fear of being publicly characterized as “conscious dis-
regarders” and its attendant reputational harm, the failure to adopt exculpation clauses 
would not necessarily reflect the optimal position. Courts, then, should not take a firm’s 
failure to opt out as an endorsement of a robust conscious disregard standard. On the other 
hand, it is not clear that “conscious disregard” has greater rhetorical power than “duty of 
care.” If boards felt free to propose exculpation for the latter, why not the former? Given 
the Chancery Court opinion in Lyondell, it may even have been that shareholders would 
have received such proposals positively.  
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are legitimate, on balance they do not provide reasons to avoid  
permissible exculpation.  
 Recall the description in Part III.A.2 of the “plus factor” approach to 
a conscious disregard standard. Under that approach, evidence of some 
readily ascertainable plus factor would trigger good faith liability if 
gross negligence is proven. If the plus factors were underinclusive, in-
sofar as they would not capture all of the motivations that we might 
think would cause a director to act in bad faith, they might still pro-
vide a limited set of cases that are qualitatively different than stan-
dard due care cases.247 Caremark duties provide an example of an un-
derinclusive plus factor, the factor being the context of the claim—the 
establishment of a reporting system for purposes of legal compliance. 
Allowing exculpation of these cases may render Caremark duties even 
weaker than they are already.248 Of course, this need not be the case 
because firms could tailor their exculpation clauses to retain Caremark
liability.249  However, given the experience of due care exculpation in 
which mass opting out occurred without fine distinctions, such a slice-
and-dice approach might not be expected.  
 Although this Article’s approach would make the cases that lie on 
the wrong side of the plus factors potentially exculpable, the underin-
clusive plus-factor approach would necessarily reject liability in the 
set of conscious disregard cases with no evidence of the plus factor. If 
the applicable plus factor was evidence of a close personal friendship 
between a director and a CEO, this Article’s approach would make 
grossly negligent decisions made in that context exculpable. An ap-
proach strictly limited to plus factors, however, would require that 
grossly negligent directors who were not close friends with the CEO 
be absolved from liability. Along this line, the latter approach would 
presumably lead one to conclude that there was no conscious disre-
gard in McPadden. The approach advocated in this Article, on the 
other hand, would allow courts to decide that the i2 directors who 
signed off on the TSC sale process violated their duty of good faith, 
but give firms the ability to exculpate any attendant liability ex ante.
 This Article does not purport to have convincingly demonstrated 
that a liberal approach to conscious disregard with permissible ex-
                                                                                                                    
 247. Overinclusive plus factors like the kind proposed by Hill and McDonnell, see supra
notes 214-219 and accompanying text, do not raise this concern as forcefully because, un-
like underinclusive plus factors, they impose additional costs by requiring the rejection of 
exculpation in a number of due care cases.  
 248. See, e.g., Posting of Harry Gerla to The Race to the Bottom, “Caremark—
The Failed Revolution”, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/ 
caremarkthe-failed-revolution.html (Feb. 15, 2008, 06:15 EST) (observing that the Care-
mark standard is “more like a Potemkin village than a revolution”). 
 249. This Article does not take a position on this approach other than to note that the 
greater the number of categories, the more forceful the public good and network externali-
ty arguments may become. 
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culpation is superior to a restrictive approach to conscious disregard 
without exculpation. But two points militate in its favor. First, much 
of the dispute between the alternative conceptions turns on how 
much one believes that shareholder approval of exculpation is persu-
asive evidence of the desirability of such exculpation. For instance, if 
shareholders agreed to exculpate for Caremark violations, should 
that give us pause? If trust in the charter amendment process is 
high, liberal construction with permissible exculpation will almost 
certainly be preferable. Suffice it to say that this Article takes a less 
skeptical point of view, at least as regards past due care exculpation 
decisions and potential conscious disregard exculpation decisions. 
Second, as discussed in Part III.B.1, there is reason to suspect that 
exculpation will always be preferable from a firm’s perspective to the 
extent that insurance is otherwise generally available to cover direc-
tors’ liability for conscious disregard, even in the Caremark context. 
 The final argument against allowing exculpation of conscious dis-
regard liability derives from the observation that good faith provides 
Delaware courts with substantial flexibility to shift the balance of au-
thority and accountability.250 This flexibility may serve as a safety 
valve in times of upheaval when Delaware’s normally deferential lia-
bility rules appear unresponsive to the antimanagement sentiment of 
the day. Courts, fearful of losing power via federal preemption, can 
use rhetoric to signal to the corporate law community that Delaware 
is taking steps to move things in the preferred direction.251 Alterna-
tively, when public sentiment calms, good faith’s vagueness allows 
courts to reverse course as necessary to prevent corporate migration 
to more board-friendly states.252
 Good faith, and therefore conscious disregard, is an obvious candi-
date for this function because of its status as an exception to exculpa-
tion clauses. Delaware courts could have tinkered with the business 
judgment rule just as easily as they did with good faith, but that 
would not have been a credible rhetorical device because due care ex-
culpation would be there to protect grossly negligent directors. If the 
conscious disregard standard was borne out of a strategic attempt to 
circumvent section 102(b)(7) clauses, allowing exculpation of liability 
                                                                                                                    
 250. See Griffith, supra note 35, at 52. 
 251. See id. at 53-58. See also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2491, 2510-19 (2005). Roe describes the interplay between Delaware law and federal 
preemption and, more importantly, posits that it is in corporate constituencies’ interests to 
prevent federal preemption. If that is the case, one might expect that boards and share-
holders will be less likely to propose and accept exculpation if the threat of federal preemp-
tion is credible.  
 252. Id. at 57 (“When the risk of federal intervention recedes, however, the corporate 
lobby may reassert itself, pressing the legislature and, indirectly, the judiciary to return to 
a position of board deference.”). 
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makes no sense. All of the flexibility gained through the invocation of 
good faith and the avoidance of clear rules would be lost.253
 The political expediency argument against permitting conscious 
disregard exculpation is most powerful as a positive one. Thus, we 
may be able to predict that Delaware is unlikely to allow for any kind 
of good faith exculpation, and certainly not in an era of heightened 
sensitivity to corporate misbehavior. As a normative ground for pre-
venting conscious disregard exculpation, the argument ultimately 
leads to a calculation of the likelihood of federal preemption and any 
potential costs to firms associated with that move. An evaluation of 
either variable is beyond the scope of this Article,254 though it would 
seem that the burden of proof is rightly placed on those who would 
advocate limiting firm choice to prevent federal preemption.  
 Most importantly, the concern over preemption can be truly alle-
viated only by a robust, nonexculpable version of good faith. As the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lyondell demonstrated, the law turned 
against exactly that version. If the practical alternative to the ap-
proach advocated in this Article is instead such an underinclusive 
version of conscious disregard, even a nonexculpable version of that 
standard will be subject to criticism and the potential for preemption. 
In fact, it is likely to be even more so. Along these lines, it seems like-
ly that a shareholder-blessed liability limitation would fare better in 
the court of public opinion than a judicially-imposed one. If pushed, 
Delaware could credibly claim that it did the best that it could re-
garding corporate governance, but that firms (including sharehold-
ers) simply preferred the old system. 
                                                                                                                    
 253. Unless, of course, another standard beyond conscious disregard was announced to 
allow for play in politically sensitive cases. 
 254. For more on the likelihood of federal preemption, see, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & As-
saf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corpo-
rate Charters, 112 YALE L. J. 553, 604-05 (2002) (arguing preemption threat is weak); Grif-
fith, supra note 35, at 57 (contending preemption threat is meaningful); Renee M. Jones, 
Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 637-
38 (2004) (asserting preemption threat is meaningful); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competi-
tion, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 596-98 (2003) (arguing preemption threat is meaningful). For
more on the merits of federal preemption, see, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5 (The AEI Press 1993); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping 
Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., Spring 2003 at 31 (favoring the benefits of regula-
tory competition); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federal Intervention To Enhance 
Shareholder Choice, 87 VA. L. REV. 993 (2001) (favoring an optional federal regime for 
takeover law); Jones, supra, at 636-37 (advocating federal preemption under certain cir-
cumstances on the grounds of political legitimacy); Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some 
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280-81 (1985) (advocating fed-
eral preemption under certain circumstances). 
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V.   CONCLUSION
 Given the potentially neutering effect that a robust conscious dis-
regard standard would likely have on due care exculpation, there is 
serious reason to be skeptical of its appropriateness. On the other 
hand, consciousness matters, or at least it is reasonable to think it 
might matter to parties to the corporate contract. Adjustments to the 
conscious disregard standard are almost certain to err in favor of one 
or the other consideration, if a well-defined standard is even possible. 
Any heterogeneity among firms over liability preferences only makes 
matters worse. 
 Because of the intensely empirical nature of the question at hand, 
modesty is likely the best course. Modesty, in this case, requires turn-
ing the liability decisions over to negotiations between managers and 
shareholders. To be sure, firms might reach the wrong answer them-
selves. Whether to permit conscious disregard exculpation depends 
largely on the faith one has in the charter amendment process. The 
likely homogeneity of firm choices regarding due care exculpation and 
the relative power that boards have in the amendment process are 
troubling. But even so, conscious disregard exculpation is not the sort 
of rule that firms are likely to systematically get more wrong than due 
care exculpation, an opt-out rule that has largely been accepted by 
commentators and practitioners. In many important ways, the argu-
ment for allowing conscious disregard exculpation mirrors the one for 
allowing due care exculpation. If there is little difference between the 
two, critics of the proposal advocated in this Article will have to argue 
that permitting due care exculpation was a bad idea as well.  
Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court’s statement on the matter, 
was not a modest decision in any sense. Without the possibility of 
firms exculpating conscious disregard claims, the court pretended to 
know the unknowable. Unsurprisingly, it erred on the side of protect-
ing due care exculpation and director authority. Indeed, considering 
that exculpation is not available and that there is little legislative in-
terest in changing the status quo, it is hard to say that the court 
could have done better. On the other hand, such an approach does 
have the effect of relieving any pressure on the Delaware legislature 
to extend exculpation to conscious disregard claims, forcing the law 
to remain in what is at most a second-best state. 
 If the rise and fall of conscious disregard demonstrates anything, 
it is that mandatory provisions in corporate law can have pernicious 
results. By requiring liability for bad faith, the Delaware legislature 
put an enormous amount of pressure on Delaware courts to decide 
the fate of good faith. Considering that there was never any reasoned 
basis for making good faith mandatory, the state of play after Lyon-
dell is unfortunate. Perhaps there is no turning back, but even if that 
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is the case, this episode provides a cautionary tale in favor of default 
corporate law rules absent significant countervailing considerations.  
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